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promises of fixed real pensions (defined benefit).
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1. Introduction
Many countries are reforming their pension systems, but the motivations are
very different. In developing countries and transition economies,  basic clean-
up is in order, as inefficiency  and abuse are extensive. In other countries, the
pension system is inequitable. In yet other countries the covered groups do
not believe that the pension system will deliver the insurance they seek, i.e.
they believe their pensions will be taxed away by inflation or other means.
Emergency measures to clean up the problems that currently seem most
urgent can easily be in conflict with long-term objectives. This danger is
substantial, as long-term objectives in pension policy are usually ill-defined
and poorly understood. This paper offers a framework to guide long-term
economic policy towards mandatory pensions.
Different objectives in government policies towards pensions are the
standard situation. For example, pension systems are expected to provide
income redistribution, worker protection from employer abuse, tax incentives
for long-term savings and mandatory earnings-related pensions, all at the
same time. This paper adopts the fundamental assumption that each of these
objectives can be approached independently, originating different types of
government interventions. This is more than an assumption. In fact, this is
the conclusion of a companion paper (Valdes-Prieto, 1993).  Treating these
objectives separately allows both the development of a sound basis for policy
and separation of design from administrative implementation.
For example, the objective  of income redistribution does not have to be
attained by tinkering with mandatory earnings-related pensions, or health
insurance for that matter. The government has an alternative set of tools - tax
and transfer policies - that may be more effective to achieve redistribution
towards the poor old or the old in general. Regarding intervention to assure
protection of those workers that enter into voluntary contracts for old-age
savings or insurance with their employer, such as in large corporations in
many OECD countries ("private pensions"), a similar result obtains. These
regulations can be part of general regulations for consumer protection, where
voluntary pensions are just one instance, and they do not have to be
considered necessarily in the mandatory pension system.
This paper does not discuss in detail the two main justifications  for
government intervention when mandating purchase insurance for old age,
invalidity and survivorship. Still, it is useful to mention them here. The first
is the prevalence of improvidence among significant parts of the population.
The second is the reduction of the fiscal cost of supporting members of
pressure groups that force the government to finance their old age by failing
to save on their own.2
This paper also assumes that the country under study will mandate insurance
for old age, invalidity and survivorship. This assumptior. is by no means
innocent, because it is possible that in many countries the best policy is to
avoid mandating savings and insurance while creating redistributive
programs in favor of the poor old. The fact that New Zealand, Australia and
South Korea did not have mandatory earnings-related pensions until very
recently suggests this is an institution that can be dispensed with for at least
some decades. Still, there is a subset of countries that have mandatory
earnings-related pensions and can improve on the particular design they
have. This paper is aimed at those countries.
Our main proposition is that mandatory earnings-related pension systems
can be classified along three economically independent desirn  dimensions.
These are insurance design, privatization versus nationalization, and the
funding mode. Sections  2, 3 and 4 suggest that many hybrid forms are feasible
and sometimes more desirable.
Section 2 discusses insurance design and financial guarantees. This yields a set
of specific policy recommendations at the microeconomic  level, that are
useful for ccuntry advice. We highlight the distinction between the flat (i.e.
"social"  insurance) and individual actuarial factors, and their implications for
income distribution and risk sharing. Protection of pensions from inflation
leads to a discussion of methods of indexation. Another important topic are
the gains from international diversification of demographic and investment
risks. Intergenerational risk sharing Is also discussed.
Section 3 discusses nationalization versus privatization of pension services
production and demand. This is an emotionally charged issue where
dispassionate analysis is scarce. We argue that privatization of production is
feasible in the pension services industry. On the demand side, provider
selection can be privatized, either through the use of private trustees or
through individual choice. We argue that unassisted individual choice of
provider is inconsistent with the diagnosis of widespread improvidence.
However, we find that mandated use of private trustee foundations chosen by
employers and unions is compatible with improvidence so it is the natural
way to "privatize"  demand.
The gain from privatization is a higher quality of individual insurance for
workers and a smaller perceived tax  in mandatory contributions. This is
achieved by reducing the historically large probability of unilateral
renegotiation of pension promises by the political process. This situation is
associated in developing countries - and in some quite wealthy as well - to
nationalized provision governed by statute. Taxation of pension rights by the
political system is harder when independent trustees and private fund
managers can represent the interests of workers in opposing it. Protection is3
also increased when pension rights are backed in part by investments abroad,
particularly in smaller countries.
Another advantage of privatization is that management of the consequences
of demographic change becomes automatic, reducing the delay and perverse
measures that have been observed when management is in charge of the
political system. The costs of privatization are also discussed in section 3,
including higher administrative costs and substantial regulatory
requirements needed to limit the possibilities of exploitation and fraud by
private providers.
Section 4 discusses the third design dimension, the degree of funding. We
first offer a fiscal neutrality result: privatization of provision and demand,
and a diversification of investments away from government promises, do not
require any changes in the primary fiscal accounts nor in tax incidence -
considering both intergenerational and current incidence. In this case the
pension system does not serve as a new source of savings. This establishes
that funding is an economically separate design dimension.
Our macroeconomic  review shows that introducing a funded rather  than an
unfunded system avoids a reduction in national saving rate for a few decades
and allows a higher stock of capital in the long run. In the case of countries
that already have a mature PAYG-financed  pension system, a reduction of the
capital stock has already occurred and cannot be reversed unless a saving
program is started anew. If expectations take a particular form -expected
pensions are zero at first - the capital stock can increase in the "short" run
when introducing a PAYG-financed  pensions, but in the long run when
expectations are met this result is reversed.
In the presence of credit constraints, introducing a mandatory funded system
actually increases the capital stock in the long run, while mandating a PAYG-
financed system still leads to a reduction in the capital stock in the long run.
The possibility of forcing a higher capital stock associated to full funding
raises the concern that the marginal productivity of capital may fall below the
long-term growth rate, or equivalently, that the capital market is unable to
absorb all these savings at an interest rate above the long-term growth rate.
However, a movement to partial funding through the issue of public debt
and immediate consumption of the proceeds is a policy response that
prevents this outcome.
After discussing international experience regarding funding, and the political
dynamics associated to it, we argue that the linkages between the degree of
funding and "constitutional"  design are critical for long term success. The
design of political incentives includes both institutional design and the
degree of privatization.4
The concluding section of this paper discusses the interaction between the
three design dimensions: can we combine a social benefit formula with
private management ? Maybe the independence of the three design
dimensions is limited when adding political economy considerations. In any
case, the best overall design is the one that maximizes the size and security of
pension benefits for individual workers, for any given contribution rate.
.Insurance Design.
The first responsibility of a mandatory pension system is to provide the
services that are expected from it, namely earnings-related pensions for old-
age, invalidity and survivors that replace lost earning power and preserve the
standard of living.
The net social value of mandatory earnings-related pensions is less than the
value of the insurance it provides. This is because in the absence of
compulsion, other institutions like the family, the private capital market and
some firms would still offer insurance to their members and workers. Only
the extra value afforded by compulsion of misinformed, miscalculating,
myopic or lazy workers can be assigned legitimately to this government
intervention.
However, this extra value can be negative if the design of the pension system
provides low quality insurance from the individual's point of view. Low
quality may be result of the overall design of the political incentives, which
leads to default on pension promises by the govenment (as in Mexico in the
1980s)  or of specific  microeconomic  design features. This section focuses on
the latter, and section 4 takes up the former.
Unfortunately, in a number of countries the technical design of pensions is
dismal. For example, Spain paid unindexed pensions until 1985.
Consideration of diversification and risk management is typically inadequate.
The design of benefit formulae is defficient in all countries. Rational design at
the microeconomic level can contribute significantly to the technical
efficiency of most pension systems.
2.1 Basic  Intra-Generational Insurance
a) The contribution  rate. The fundamental role of a pension system is to
allow preservation of consurr.ption levels in case of old-age, invalidity and
insurance. This requires that the contribution rate be chosen appropriately.
An excessive contribution rate may generate pension benefits that are larger
than the disposable salary while working. This entails an excessive  reduction
in take-home pay when active. An insufficient contribution rate finances5
pensions that are much lower than the disposable salary while working. Both
are symptoms that the pension system is not meeting its purpose efficiently.
An actuarial study can determine the contributior, rate that will support a
"replacement ratio" , i.e. the ratio of disposable pension to disposable wage, in
the range of 50-70%.
Contribution rates can be differentiated by age and sex. The Swiss option of
having lower contribution rates for those below age 32 may be attractive irn
de-.-eloping  countries, where it is important to avoid incentives, due the
combination of credit constraints dnd forced contributions, that push young
workers to prefer the informal sector. In Singapore, contribution rates are
lower for those above age 55, to induce them to postpone retirement.
b) Indexation of pension ben^fits (Inflation Guarantee).  In many pension
systems, property nghts to benefits are vulnerable to domestic inflation. This
prevents the pension system from meeting its basic purpose, which is to
preserve consumption power when the insured contingencies occur (old age,
invalidity and death). If expected domestic inflation for the next 40 years
cannot be reduced to zero, then some policy measure is needed so that current
contributions are not peceived as a pure tax by the young. Note that a simple
reduction of inflation to hard currency levels, say 3% per year, is not enough
because it implies a 70%  depreciation over 40 years.
Indexation of benefits to a Consumer Price Index is the standard answer to
escape long-term inflation.
In the case of PAYG-financed  pension systems or apparently funded pension
system - those funded systems which are heavily invested in government
securities not backed by outside assets - indexation of benefits requires indexed
government debt. In fact, pension promises in several countries are indexed
to the evolution of the CPI or salary indices, so a significant portion of
government debt is alreay indexed.
However, explicit indexation of government bonds raises fears about
inflexibility  of fiscal spending and an increase in the risk of a fiscal  crisis. That
is why to achieve stable indexation, some complementary measures are
necessary. The first one is to improve the ability of the tax system to collect
revenue in an inflationary environment. That implies the collection
methods must require frequent partial payment, and that the penalties in case
of delay must be based on real interest rates, not nominal rates.
In the case of funded pension systems that are heavily invested in private
sector securities, inflation is a very serious challenge. Most capital markets in
the world do not offer indexed bonds. This explains why employer based
pension funds in the OECD rely very heavily in equity investments, which
are less exposed to inflation risks.  The cost of this is that pension portfolios
may be too risky.6
That is why funding of pensions requires an effort to extend indexation to
debt finance. This is a major drawback of funded pensions, but it not
impossible to overcome, as explained in 4.2.
c) Insure the risk of longevity. A number of mandatory pension systems
follow the Provident Fund model, where old age benefits are paid in the form
of a lump-sum. This feature is usually criticized because it does not provide
insurance for longevity risk, which is the risk of outliving one's financial
resources. The risk of longevity can be insured with annuities. The level of
monthly payment is calculated with a mortality table, so that the resources
freed by those who die early, plus interest, finance t}  e pensions of those that
die later than average.
The critique of lump-sum benefits is that it assumes that older people are not
subject to lack of self-cor.trol, misinformation, miscalculation laziness or
myopia. The assumption is that old people will spend their lump-sum wisely.
This is at odds with the rationale for all mandatory insurance. Summing up a
complex literature, the first of these rationales is the prevalence of
improvidence among significant parts of the population. The second
rationale is to reduce the fiscal cost of helping influential groups that count
on govermnent help to supplement their income in old age. There are
indications suggesting that improvidence continues to affect a substantial
share of the por.  'ation after age 50 and also after age 65, in several countries.
However this hypothesis could be tested through surveys fc" any given
country.
d) Insure for invalidity and death. A number of countries do not mandate
invalidity insurance nor survivors'  insurance. For countries that already
decided to mandate old-age pensions, the additional cost of mandating
invalidity and survivor insurance can 'oe modest, since group contracts can be
taken for bids.
Most of the additional costs are associated to medical measurement of actual
invalidity and to iehabilitation of partial invalids. Independent and accurate
review of invalidity claims is essential to prevent abuse by unscrupulous
physicians who sell invalidity certificates or medical exams to claimants that
are not actually invalid. Independent review is also necessary to avoid
discretionary granting of invalidity pensions as payment for political favors.
This insurance must be designed with a view towards adverse selection and
moral hazard. In Chile up to 1983,  people could obtain invalidity coverage
with just 12 months of voluntary contributions, and the pension would be
based on the average contribution for those months. This allowed abuse by
some people who affiliated to the pension system after becoming invalid,
raising the invalidity rate much above the actual invalidity incidence among
long-term members. This adverse selection problem raises the cost of
invalidity coverage substantially. It also lends itself to moral hazard, as7
invalids are prepared to over-report income for those 12 months as that will
increase their permanent pension substantially. The solution is to l.mit this
coverage to members that have contributed for a substantial period. This was
achieved in Chile by linking the invalidity pension to the average of
contributions for the past 10 years unless the worker is very young. As recent
workers have many zeros in that average, they obtain very low pensions.
2.2 The design of Benefit Formulae
a) The Covered Wage and Redistribution
Observed redistribution is either planned or unintended. Most pension
systems use non-neutral definitions of the covered wage in the benefit
formulae, which induce unintended redistributions that frequently
overwhelm the explicit redistribution incorporated in the formula. A critical
result is that the quality of the insurance provided to the individual is
reduced. This section explains how to weed out unintended redistribution.
Any benefit formula determines pensions as follows:
(1) P = Po +  (1-t)a-W  , where
P = the pension to be piid.
Po = flat rate component. a-W is tne earnings-related component.
W = covered wage at retirement.
a= actuarial factor. It can be constant, or be a function of other variables. It can
be different for each individual or be uniform for all covered workers. The
actuarial factor is given by the budget constraint at the individual or group
level. In all cases the actuarial factor is "forward looking", in the sense that it
seeks .inancial equilibrium over some number of years into the future.
t = tax rate on benefits, whose revenue is used to finance the flat rate
component Po.
A pension system can be designed to be as redistributive as desired, by raising
tax  t to finance an increase in i'o. An alternative is to raise general taxes and
increase fiscal support to the pension system so that Po can be raised. Both
options generate planned wealth redistribution.
Most mandatory pension systems use formulas to determine the covered
wage W that induce unintended wealth redistributions. An exception are
defineci contribution systems. These are simple inefficiencies  that can be
remedied at low cost. Consider the following widely used definitions of W:8
i) W is calculated as an average of past norninal wages. This method is used
in Spain, 'where  the average of the nominal wages for the last 8 years of work
determines W, with the nominal wages of the earliest 6 years adjusted for CPI
inflation up to two years before the date of pensioning. This leaves
beneficiaries subject to inflation risk. An eventual bout of inflation in the last
two years of work can reduce real pensions substantially, so the quaiity of
these pensions from an individual's point of view is quite limited.
ii) W is calculated as the last wage while active, or the average of a small
number of the last years while active. The extreme version of this method,
basing W on the last wage, is currently used in Germany for dvil servant
pensions, and in defined-benefit private pensions offered by large employers
in the OECD.  Brazil  bases W on the avenge of CPI-adjusted earnings during
the last three years. This formula reduces inflation risk but leaves the worker
exposed to the risk of a real wage reduction in those last years. More worrying,
this method for calculating W is regressive, since it is an established empirical
fact that the poor have a flatter path of lifetime incomel,2. Given this, higher
income worl  rs will get a higher pension in relation to their contributions.
iii) W is calculated as the average of CPI-adjusted wages during the Ni best of
the last N2 years (with Ni < N2). France defines W as the average of the best
10 vears since 1947.  Bulgaria defines W as the average of the three consecutive
years with highest earnings, out of the last 15 years of work. This formula
redistributes in favor of formal sector workers that choose career paths with
highly variable earnings, which in many cases are salespeople that earn more
than blue collar workers. This method of calculation also opens the system
for abuse because there is no penalty for undercontribution for all years except
for the best NI.  Using a simple average of just 10 years of covered wages has
other drawbacks discussed below.
iv) W is calculated as the simple average of all CPI-adjusted  or wage-index-
adjusted wages since entering the labor force. For example, the United Stases
currently defines W as the simple average of earnings after 1950,  excluding
the 5 years with the lowest earnings. The problem with this method is that an
average implies equal weighing of different years, and this in turn implies
regressive redistribution in comparison to a present value formulation. With
this formula the present value (at retirement date) of contributions as a ratio
of pension benefits is lower for the rich than for the poor. This is because
more of the contributions of the rich are made closer to retirement, due to the
higher slope of their earnings path. In addition, lower-income workers
usually enter the labor market at a younger age, so they contribute for more
1  See  Ehrenberg and  Smith (1985) for  striking evidence of  "fanning-out" of
carnins-age profiles  in  the  United  States.
2  One explanation is  that higher paid jobs  allow the worker to  learn more and
increase  his/her  qualirications  over  time.9
years. Savings at age 25 receives the same credit than savings at age 35, so the
longer saving effort of low-income workers is not recognized by the formula.
v) Men and women. As women exhibit a much higher mobility in and out of
the labor force than men, on average they show a much higher number of
zeros for the wages received for the last ten years. That is why with these
formulae women get a smaller pension even though they may have
contributed the same number of years "'an  a man that went to college and
retired at 55,  but contributed more regularly. In many countries the covered
wage formula allows women to retire younger, leading to an additional set of
cross-subsidies towards and between women. Unplanned redistribution
between women that pursue different careers in the labor market is the norm,
not an exception.
A Neutral Formula
This critique shows that the benefit formula used in most countries is
technically inefficient, in the sense that it generates unplanned
redistributions. To eliminate them, we propose a truly neutral formula for
covered wages. In this formula W is reinterpreted as "covered wealth". The
neutral covered wealth is a straightforward present value calculation:
W = £,  ct wt (1+Rt)
W is the present value (at the age of retirement) of past contributions
cumulated at the effective rates of return paid by the pension system in
previous years. The neutral covered wealth formula keeps track of all
contributions at the individual level, and takes due account of their timing.
This avoids unintended redistribution. wt and Rt can be set in nominal or
real terms, as desired. More specifically,
ct-wt = contribution amount paid t years before the pension date, which is the
product of the contribution rate ct and covered earnings wt.
r- = reference rate of return during the period j years before retirement. This is
discussed below.
Rt = cumulative total rate of return for contributions paid in year t. It is
calculated as (1+.Rt)  = P j=1 to t (1+rj)  so it is the product of the "reference  rates
of return" rj in all the years between the contribution date and the pensioning
date.
The exact definition of the "reference rate of return" would depend on the
other dimensions of design. In a conventional  balanced pay-as-you-go
pension system, the reference rate of return for year k would be the rate of
growth of the covered wage bill in year k over the covered wage bill in year k-
1. In a funded pension system investing in privately issued securities and10
explicit government debt, the reference rate of return would be the return of
the funds' investments. In other cases that return is fixed by contract with
insurance companies.
After the pensioning date, the neutral formula we propose adjusts pensions
as follows: Pt = Pt.li(1+rt). This can incorporate wage growth in PAYG-
financed systems, or the return of investments in a funded system. To limit
fluctuations, a five or ten-year moving average of the reference rate of return
could be used. This replicates the fact that yields on long-term bonds are
averages of short term yields.
Adoption of the neutral definition of W allows policymakers to actually
choose the degree of redistribution of the pension system. Pension systems
that use non-neutral covered wage formulae need to incorporate some
explicit redistribution in the benefit formula just to compensate for the
unintended regressive effects listed above. One explanation of the widespread
use of non-neutral covered wage formulae is that pension calculations were
performed by hand in most countries until a couple of decades ago, so neutral
formulas were impossible to implement.
b) Redistribution through the actuarial factor.
In the above benefit formula, there is a fundamental choice to be made
regarding the actuarial factor. It can be different for each individual or be
uniform for all covered workers. The first option leads to individual
mandatory insurance and the second option leads to "flat" insurance. Flat
insurance is usually called "social"  insurance, but this benign appelative
usually hides regressive redistribution, as discussed below.
It is important to note that both design options for mandatory insurance meet
the fundamental objective  of social security, as understood by F. Blanchard,
Director General of the ILO (1984):  "Thanks to social security, the feeling of
being protected and insured against risks has ceased to be the privilege of
small miinorities,  and this has eliminated one of the main factors of class
differentiation".  That is why we prefer to use a more neutral language and
call the two options regarding actuarial factors "flat" and "individual".
An example of a flat actuarial factor is the BVG  mandatory occupational
pension system in Switzerland. In BVG  the accumulated capital must be
converted into a pension (annuity) at the rate of 7.2%,  which is an actuarial
factor fixed by law regardless of age, sex or income level 3. It must be stressed
that the BVG  system does not include explicitly redistributive provisions
3 Data from page 555 in Employee Benefits in  Europe and the  US (1992), edited
by  Howard Foster,  published  by  Longmans,  UK.11
such as a minimum pension. In Switzerland redistribution is taken care of by
a separate, state-run, system of basic pensions.
The consequences  of choosing a flat actuarial factor are:
(i) A flat actuarial factor redistributes wealth. This happens because a flat
actuarial factor does not condition on events such as sex and income class. As
there is substantial information from early in active life about these events it
is natural to define this as redistribution, not insurance. Specifically  in the old
age case, a flat actuarial factor:
* Is regressive because of the empirical fact that higher income workers have
higher life expectancy at any given pensionable age. Therefore, on average it
pays pensions for more years to the rich than to the poor.
* Redistributes wealth towards women, because they have a higher life
expectancy than men. This may seem unfair to those that feel that living
longer is a blessing.
ii) A flat actuarial factor can provide insurance as seen from early in life,
because it does not condition on events that are positively correlated with the
individual actuarial factor at retirement. The two main instances are:
* The correlation  between health status and life expectancy.  A person can be
insured against the event of being in extremely good health at the date of
retirement, in which case the pension associated to the individual actuarial
factor is low (Brugiavini, 1993).
* The negative correlation between the length of working life and life
expectancy.  A person can be insured against the event of suffering X
substantial increase in the disutility of work at an early age, say 50, by having a
flat actuarial factor - unadjusted  by age - that pays the same pension  regardless
of retirement age. Of course, the presence of this insurance leads to moral
hazard - in this case, declaring an end to working life just to take advantage of
the higher present value of pensions - which must be dealt with by reducing
insurance, as shown by Diamond and Mirlees (1978)4.
(iii) A flat actuarial factor increases uncertainty (negative insurance) as seen
from early in life, because it does not condition on events that are negatively
4  The combination  of  a  flat actuarial factor and the  provisions for late  and
early  pensioning also  redistribute wealth.  Typically  this  combination
redistributes wealth against those  that  retire  after  the  normal  age,  because  in
all  countries the  increase in  pensions is  less  than  actuarial and even  less  than
what is  required to  deal with moral hazard in  an optimal way (Diamond and
Mirlees,  1978).12
correlated with the individual actuarial factor at retirement. Two instances
are interesting.
* The positive correlation between lifetime wealth and life expectancy. As
seen from early in life, one may be uncertain about lifetime wealth, and
insurance calls for a smaller present value of pensions if a higher wealth
realization occurs. However a flat actuarial factor provides the opposite: a
higher present value of pensions, operating through the correlation between
wealth and life expectancy.
* The correlation between the cause of invalidity and life expectancy given
invalidity. As seen from early in life, one may be uncertain about  life
expectancy given the event of becoming an invalid. In this case insurance
calls for higher pensions if an invalidity with low life expectancy occurs, to
compensate the associated utility loss. However a flat actuarial factor provides
no adjustment, and thus no insurance.
It may appear that the price to obtain insurance in (ii) is redistribution as in (i)
and negative insurance as in (iii). Apparently Beveridge (1942)  thought in
those terms 5. This is incorrect because there exist alternativs arrangements to
provide insurance as in (ii), without the costs of (i) and (iii). For example
purchase of deferred annuities over time, say at ages 50, 55, 60 and 65, payable
as from age 65, can insure the worker against unforeseeable improvements in
health status.
Another attractive possibility is to have an actuarial factor function that is a
function of sex, lifetime income and age of retirement and nothing else. This
generates a flat actuarial factor for all those that have the same income, age
and sex, so it insures against health shocks that may affect life expectancy or
the level of pensions, as seen from early in life.
In the same way, purchase of deferred annuities whose benefit amount is
conditional on the age of retirement can insure against a short working life
(and impose a penalty to limit moral hazard). Both of these arrangements are
5  Beveridge (1942) reports that the  bulk of  public opinion in  Britain in  1941-42
thought  that  unemployment insurance  should  not  charge  different  premiums
to  workers in  industries with  different risk  of  unemployment. The  reason
offered was that  the  volume of  unemployment  in  any industry is  not  under its
control, and  that  those that  are  fortunate in  being  regular  should  share the
cost  of  unemployment in  those  which are  less  regular. This  argument ignores
that  people choose their  industry of  employment and that  they  may  require a
compensating wage  differential  from those  that  offer  less  regular
employment. The  required compensation may be  reduced  or  eliminated by
cross-subsidies based on  a  flat  actuarial factor. This  leaves workers  equally
well-off,  but  eliminates  the  labor  market  penalization for  employers that  offer
less  regular jobs.13
based on an individual actuarial factor as of the age of purchase, so flat
actuarial factors are avoided.
The conclusion is that the costs and benefits of flat actuarial factors should be
unbundled, so that only their desirable features are retained. Therefore,
Beveridge's (1942)  proposal of adopting flat premiums without qualification
is inefficient.  It is unfortunate that this proposal was adopted by most OECD
countries, where the actuarial factor is a constant that ranges between 0.01  and
0.02  per year (OECD,  1988).  For the same reason, there is no basis for the
proposition that a  two-tier" pension system with a flat actuarial factor for the
first tier and an indi%idually-adjusted  actuarial factor in the second is
optimal.
Countries should adjust premiums to some risks, and pool through an
actuarial function for other risks. A freely operating market will generate
some pooling in any case, because detailed risk identification can be very
costly. For example, in Chile the actuarial factor in old-age annuities is
determined at the individual level, but in market practice it is a function of
age and sex and not of the outcome of medical examinations, at least up to
now. Although the prices of invaliditv annuities are adjusted by the cause of
invalidity, there is no objection  because it is felt that this provides desirable
insurance.
The political economy of flat actuarial factors also deserves mention. Flat
actuarial factors are not unique in their ability to redistribute wealth, because
explicit taxes and transfers can also achieve that end, but are unique in
generating hidden redistributions. When confronted with a proposal to
redistribute wealth through flat actuarial factors, one can ask why the same
redistribution is not proposed to be effected  explicitly, through taxes and
transfers. In OECD countries, a typical reaction is that less redistribution
would be achieved in that way, due to political constraints. However, it is
precisely the limited political constraints associated with flat actuarial factors
that has made them very popular with pressure groups, who can obtain large
redistributions without the public noticing. For example, in the old pension
system in Chile, copper miners, which were provided the best health services
and industrial security in the country, obtained legislative approval for early
retirement by ten years, on account of "harsh working conditions", without a
reduction in the actuarial factor. It is unclear if that policy would have passed
if explicit taxes and transfers had been required.14
2.3  The value of sophisticated insurance
This section discusses the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection in
the new insurance sevices associated to flat actuarial factors.
a) Insurance for the event of a short working life. As explained before, the
date at which earnings must begin to be replaced by pension income is
stochastic from an individual point of view.
Insurance against this uncertainty requires linking the date of pensioning to
the date and degree of withdrawal from the labor force, as this defines the loss
of earnings. H-owever,  this insurance induces moral hazard, as workers may
bring forward the date and degree of their retirement just to collect  pension
payments for more years. Moral hazard occurs because the actual disutility of
labor at any age - which determines  the duration  of working  life - is not
observable by the pension system, but it is observed by the worker. The
existence of moral hazard implies that full insurance against this risk is
undesirable, but it can also be proved that some insurance is desirable.
No country has yet implemented efficient insurance against a short working
life. Simulations suggest that very stiff penalties for early retirement and very
large bonuses for late retirement are needed, with a general shape quite
different from what is observed iit the OECD. Another feature is that as
individuals may use the capital market to save and limit the consumption
cost of the penalty for early retirement, it would also be desirable to tax
savings, which is counter-intuitive (Diamond and Mirlees, 1978)6.  As the
income tax system, the safety net and invalidity coverage already provide
some degree of insurance against a short working life, the penalties and
bonuses mentioned here would have to be netted out.
This insurance is even less feasible when earnings and the degree of
retirement are not observable. In many developing countries employment as
a dependent worker in the formal sector is the only observable variable.
Earnings cannot be monitored. This is certainly the case in most developing
countries, where labor mobility between the formal, urban informal and
subsistence agricultural sectors is large. In these countries most people are
unable to file individual income tax returns, so it is not possible to use tax
information to observe employment either. If insurance againt a short
working life is attempted in this setting, workers will dedare  they have
retired to collect pensions, but would still continue working in the informal
sectors.  For this reason, this type of insurance appears interesting only for
countries with a very high degree of formality in their labor market.
6 This is  true only for non-myopic,  well informed  consumers  with full self-
control.1 5
b) Insurance against future health status. As explained before, a pension
system that calculates  an annuity at age 65 based on current life expectancy
leaves the worker exposed to the risk of having good health status. At age 65
workers have more information about their own life expectancy, because
their medical history will have unfolded. The result is that the risk of having
very good health at age 65 is not insured against.
This risk can be diversified over time if workers purchase deferred annuities
over time, if the price of annuities is adjusted as health status changes.
Another answer is a fixed annuity purchase plan starting at a young age, thiat
assumes average evolution of health status. It would compensate the higher
costs of covering those with unusually good health status with the lower costs
of covering those with below average health status.
This extra insurance is subject to difficult problems, so its desirability can be
questioned. In the first place, the costs of con.Zinuous  health examinations
must be substacted from the insurancebenefits. Moreover, private insurance
companies are wary of extensive health examinations because their personnel
becomes prone to exercise  favoritism towards clients which are in poor
health, by ignoring or delaying medical exams. Even worse, manipulation of
medical information by doctors who want to help out their patients is
widespread.
Another form of moral hazard may be very damaging in developing
countries, where continuous contribution to a fixed annuity purchase plan
starting at a young age is infrequent. The movements of individuals in and
out of formal employment would be influenced by the presence of this
insurance. Only those that remain healthy would continue contributing,
while those that begin to suffer poor health would move to the informal
sector to escape the increase in premiums needed to transfer resources to
those in good health.
Summing up, the secondary types of insurance provided by flat actuarial
factors do not seem to be valuable in many countries.
2.4 Financial Guarantees and DC versus DB.
We will now compare benefit formulas from the point of view of risk
sharing. Looking from early in active life, future wages and future "reference
rates of return" are unknown. Both enter into the determination of the
covered wage W, according to the reutral  formula. In addition, the actuarial
factor is uncertain, because it depends of the projections,  at the age of
retirement, of income sources available then, i.e. the rates of return available
from then onwards. This is apart from health status and other factors that
make the actuarial factor uncertain, treated in 2.3.16
Defined-benefit  (DB)  plans offer guarantees against some of these risks. These
plans are a contract between the worker and an entity - which may be the
employer or the government - to pay a pension fixed by contract if the
contribution and retirement conditions are met. In the standard DB plan, the
promised pension uses as covered wage the last wage while employed.
Defined contribution (DC) plans are a simple accumulation account whose
balance can be withdrawn when certain conditions are met. Withdrawal can
be phased over time or for the purchase of an annuity.
Some authors argue that since DB plans offer guarantees to workers, and they
are more risk averse than employers or the government, then DB plans are
superior to DC plans. This argument is incorrect for the standard DB  plan. At
any point in time, all the variables that enter the benefit formulas are
random, except past wages. The fact that future wages are uncertain means
that the standard DB formula pays very risky benefits. The common
denomination of this formula as "defined" benefit is inexact. On the other
hand, DC formulas generate a pension from averages of many random
variables, namely future wages and future rates of return. This implies, by the
law of large numbers, that there is significant averaging, and the resulting
pension may be more stable than the one resulting from the standard DB
plan. It is clear then that standard DB  plans are inefficient from the risk-
sharing perspective. The natural starting point for DB plans should be the
neutral formula for the covered wage.
The question is which guarantees would be added to the neutral covered
wage formula to achieve points in the risk-return frontier for pensions that
are attractive to workers. A DC plan offers a point in that frontier that may
have too much risk, and thus be rejected  by workers over less risky points.
Government insurance of pensions
Risk-sharing with workers can be obtained in two fundamental ways: by
trading in the financial market, and by guarantees issued and sold by the
country's government. For this purposes, we include the guarantees issued by
employers in favor of their employees to be a sort of financial contract with
different transaction costs. Both the financial market and the government are
abstract mechanisms, and in the end all risks are absorbed by some agent, be it
the shareholder of an insurance company or the taxpayer. This shows that the
option of having the government issue guarantees to pensioners at zero price
is inefficient,  since this ignores the cost to taxpayers of absorbing the residual
fiscal risk. We will assume now that the government either charges for the
risk absorbed or regulates risk-taking activities to reduce its cost to almost
zero.
Consider now some points regarding the appropriate role for government
insurance of pensions. An efficient allocation of risk involves three
conditions: (i) full exploitation of diversification possibilities; (ii) allocation of17
the residual risks to those that can bear them at minimum costs; and (iii)
minimum costs of information, of processing and of inefficiencies  due to
market power.
Although it is difficult to generalize, it seems that a financial market
relatively integrated to the international capital market and the governments
of large countries have similar ability to exploit diversification possibilities.
The conclusion is that for small countries the guarantees available in
financial markets dominate government guarantees.
On the second point, financial markets are clearly adept at allocating residual
risks to those that wish to bear them at minimum costs. The political process
is adept at shifting the residual fiscal risks towards those taxpayers or transfer
recipients with less representation and voice, which is usually a quite
different set of people. This suggests that on this count the financial market
may be superior.
On the third point, the open financial market can be worse than government
guarantees because of high processing and information costs. Employers  may
have lower transaction costs, but be worse also because many have some
market power with regards to their employees. This market power may show
up as a large wage reduction for risk averse workers who prefer a stable
employment and desire to transfer their pension investment risks to others.
Summing up, government insurance of risks may be an attractive option in
the case of large countries, provided that recipients are charged for this
service.
Existing Financial Markets
Another important point is that there is a substantial difference between
existing financial markets for specific sources of risk. The market for defined-
benefit plans offers an all-or-nothing investment guarantee, with no
intermediate degrees. The market for financial guarantees, on the other hand,
offers a large array of partial guarantees, including non-linear risk-sharing
formulas.  Partial insurance may be made age-dependent by allowing people
near pensioning to shift towards a safer investment portfolio, i.e. heavily
weighted to fixed-income  CPI-indexed securities.
This difference is important because the high cost of full guarantees. A full
guarantee of a long-term pension is very expensive, because the number of
events that may make the insurer suffer a loss is so large that precise
calculations are not available, and the fear of uncertainty reduces the supply
of willing insurers. As the volume of guarantees offered at low prices is likely
to be much smaller than the volume of guarantees required by a national
pension system, the market price of full insurance is bound to be very
expensive.1 8
Therefore, unless pensioners exhibit zero risk tolerance, they should be
willing to bear at least some risk in exchange for a higher expected return.
This suggests that most individual workers may be better off with a partial
guarantee. The precise design of that guarantee may depend of the existing
financial markets, the size of the government, and the ability of the
government to shift risk to taxpayer efficiently.
2.5 Inter-generational Insurance.
Insurance of this type refers to risk-sharing between generations. Important
events that can be covered are the risk of being born into a unusually
numerous generation, and the risk of belonging to an unusually long-lived
generation.
Market exchange provides intergenerational insurance, regardless of the type
of pension system in force. For example, the event of being born in an
uncommonly numerous cohort generates predictable effects in equilibrium
prices: first, real wages will be depressed while this cohort lives out its active
stage.  That will induce a reduction in labor supply from other cohorts and a
shift by firms towards more labor-intensive production techniques. These and
other market adjustments reduce the extent to which wages are depressed for
the unlucky cohort, providing partial insurance. When this cohort retires and
starts selling assets equilibrium rates of return will rise transitorily. Asset
prices will fall but will be expected to recover over the longer term. This will
induce a transitory increase in saving by the young that will reduce the extent
to which asset prices fall, providing partial insurance.
If the numerous cohort includes only those born in one or a couple of years,
then there will be many contemporaneous generations and insurance will be
almost complete. Insurance is much more limited if the numerous cohort
covers those born over fifty years. The reason is that a more permanent shock
to fertility is harder to insure than a very transitory one. In an open economy
the situation is much more favorable, because market exchange with
contemporaneous groups that reside in other countries can provide
substantial insurance. If the capital account is open, fluctuations in domestic
asset prices will be much smaller. The response to the appearance of a
numerous generation will be a fluctuation in net external assets. A part of the
real wage fluctuations can be moderated by international migration. A small
country achieves substantial insurance through market exchange.
In a large semi-closed economy, a mandatory pension system can provide
additional insurance or undo part of the insurance provided by the market
mechanism, depending of its design. If the pension system is fully funded
(fully invested in outside assets like public and private physical capital,
private sector securities and foreign securities) then the induced fluctuation
in asset prices will be as described above, and market exchange with
contemporaneous generations will provide insurance.19
A balanced pay-as-you-go pension system may supplement or subtract from
market-provided insurance. When such a pension system is in force, being
born in a specially numerous generation implies that the burden of
supporting the previous generation is spread among more persons, so the
contribution rate can be reduced. If in fact contributions are reduced, this
compensates in part the reduction in the gross wage originating in the
increased supply of labor. However, the contribution rate will have to rise in
the future (transitorily) by more than what it is first reduced, to finance the
retirement benefits of the numerous generation. If this actually happens, this
shifts part of the financial risk to the subsequent generations.
More frequently, the political system manages balanced PAYG  systems to
subtract from market-provided insurance. The contribution rate is typically
maintained while the numerous generation is active and the additional
revenue is spent raising benefits. This reduces the capital stock and reduces
real wages further, making members of the numerous generation even worse
off. As the numerous generation ages, the contribution rate must rise very
substantially to honor the higher benefit levels 7. This implies that the risk of
default on pension entitlements by the next generation rises considerably. In a
conventional government-managed pension system, default could take the
form of legislated increases in the pensionable age or less than full
adjustment of pensions for past inflation. Once this process is set in motion,
inter-generational insurance is abandoned and nothing prevents benefit
levels from being reduced substantially. If the new higher benefits are
honored, the subsequent generations will g,t a lot of the risk and will be
saddled with a reduced capital stock per worker. At the individual level, a
PAYG pension system with these dynamics increases uncertainty and undoes
part of the insurance available through the price mechanism.
A mixed alternative is to save the additional revenue raised while the
numerous generations is active. This may require reforms in other design
dimensions to be effective, as the US experience shows. In that country, a
trust fund was legislated in 1983  for this purpose, but 100%  of the funds were
invested in non-tradable treasury debt. Apparently the US government has
increased its budget deficit, rather than reduce it as it would be required,
because of the availability of easy finance from the trust fund (Leonard, 1990)
8. Because  of this arrangement, the next generation in the US has avoided a
large increase in social security contributions,  but instead faces a substantial
increase in taxes to service the debt to the social security trust fund. As this
may provoke default, individual uncertainty may have increased.
7  Although  the contribution  rate rises transitorily,  it must still remain at a
long-run level higher than the  initial level, because benefits were raised.
8  This can be seem in  the  fact that the Gramm-Rudman  Deficit Reduction Act
defined budget targets in  terms  of  the  ordinary budget and  the  social security
surplus  combined.20
A much better mechanism for inter-generational insurance in a semi-closed
economy is fiscal policy that changes the explicit public debt. If a given
generation appears unlucky, the government can subsidize it and finance the
expenses by issuing public debt. If another generation is considered lucky, it
can be taxed and the proceeds used to reduce the public debt. This approach is
not contractual in nature and relies on ex-post benevolence. Although it is
also vulnerable to political manipulation, it has the advantage of being
explicit, transparent and much more targeted, as compared to the
intergenerational transfers originated in a PAYG-financed  pension system. In
this context, the meaning of targeting is that just the generations identified as
needy are helped, and not the whole set of those currently alive as when the
contribution rate is raised in a balanced PAYG  system.
This ana vsis suggests that a conventional  PAYG  pension system managed by
the political system is a cumbersome and unpredictable instrument for
achieving inter-generational insurance. It appears wiser to provide this type
of insurance using market exchange with contemporaneous generations and
specific decisions to change the public debt, each one targeted to a specific
source of inter-generational inequity.
2.6 Partial Coverage and individual insurance.
Mandatory pension systems are mandatory only for workers that can be
forced to contribute, which in most developing countries exclude the self-
employed, individual entrepreneurs and the informal sector.
In practice, substantial job rotation in and out of the covered sector implies
that many workers will contribute sporadically, i.e. in the periods in which
they work in the formal sector. Some of them will accumulate few pension
entitlements and most of the time they will not be fully covered by invalidity
and survivors insurance. The state is simply unable to mandate earnings-
related pensions for a substantial number of workers.
From an insurance point of view, this means that the mandatory pension
system does not offer a substantial reduction in risk to many of these workers.
The social benefit will be smaller if the design of the pension system provides
low quality insurance from the individual's point of view. This outcome is
made worse by provisions that impose a minimum number of years of
contribution to obtain entitlements to an old-age pension. These provisions
reduce substantially the value of contributions for workers that rotate
randomly into the informal sector 9.
9  Those provisions  may also reduce  the incentive  to undersave  for old age
created by  the  existence of  a  basic pension, but  that happens only if  basic
pensions  are  limited  to  contributors  to  the  earnings-related  pension  system.
That  is  not  desirable  in  general  because  basic  pensions  require  an
independent  design  based  on  its  own  logic  (see  section  2.1).21
The provisions that make coverage for invaiidity and survivorship
contingent only on the duration of the last spell of work at the formal sector
also increase uncertainty at the individual level. Both cut the contribution-
benefit link, generating a disincentive to work in the formal sector.
The implication is that these provisions must be designed taking into account
the degree of job rotation nto the formal sector. For example, coverage for
invalidity and survivorship can be defined on the basis of the average of
contributions over a longer period, such as ten years. Another possibility is to
give priority to invalidity and survivorship coverage. More permanent
coverage of these risks may be achieved for infrequent contributors by
automatically drawing down the rights they have accumulated for the old-age
pension to finance continuous insurance coverage.
The fact that administration costs are positive and sometimes significant
argues in favor of an exemption from contributions to workers of the formal
sector that exhibit a low enough density of contributions in the past.
3. The Second Design Dimension: Privatization
Privatization is a second design dimension in earnings-related mandatory
pension systems, which is independent from insurance design and funding,
although some interactions exist.
There are two types of privatization: (a) contracting out of services to private
providers, including fund management if funds exist and purchase of
insurance and reinsurance. For example, a small country may wish to
reinsure part of its invalidity and survivorship risk abroad. (b) Creation e f a
market in pension provision, which combines private provision with private
choice among providers. This avoids dependence of providers from
procurement contracts awarded by the political system. In this alternative, the
government regulates several aspects of private choice and provision. This
section discusses both types of privatization.
3.1 Nationalization of insurance and savings provision
This subsection reviews the potential problems associated with the
competitive production of insurance to determine if the set of appropriate
policy responses includes nationalization of production. In many cases
nationalization is unwarranted. This review will follow the classification  of
insurance policies established in the previous section.
Forced saving for old age: There are many privately-managed saving vehicles
available in the capital market. In many countries the market failures that22
affect bank deposits and mutual funds have been dealt with independent
regulation. Competitive private provision can produce this service efficiently.
Inflation Guarantee: As discussed in section 2.1, these guarantees can be
provided by local issuers of fixed-income  securities, such as the private sector
and the government, provided this type of financial contracts are allowed by
the government to financial intermediaries.
Longevity insurance: A potentially damaging problem here is adverse
selection 1O.  Those that have private information that their life expectancy is
below-average may choose not to purchase an annuity, raising the cost for
those with average life expectancy.  This cost increase can induce the latter not
to purchase annuities, worsening the cost problem. If adverse selection is
important, one possible government intervention is mandatory purchase of
annuities. This could be opposed by the workers that want to leave a bequest.
One solution is to allow partial bequests in annuity contracts. For example,
authorized annuities may be required to include a minimum of, say, ten years
of payment even if the insured person dies before. As international
experience with the automobile insurance market shows, there is no case for
nationalization of provision.
Invalidity and Survivors' insurance: The adverse selection problem here
refers to the possibility that those who receive information of being high risks
may choose higher amounts of this insurance or migrate to the formal sector
and vice versa. Again, mandating purchase of a fixed amount of coverage,
which at the individual level may be a function of average earnings, solves
the first problem.
One approach to the problem of migration to the informal sector is to bundle
the provision of this insurance with other insurance lines, so that the losers
in one insurance line gain in another line. For example, invalidity and
survivorship insurance may be bundled with health insurance and worker
accidents and professional diseases insurance. This reduces substantially the
incentive to move to the informal sector.
Observability:  Observation of some events, such as death, may be a natural
monopoly for the government. However, the government may solve these
problems without nationalizing insurance provision. Observability of death
can be provided by the civil registries. Observation of the resumption of work
by somebody declared invalid may be a natural monopoly for the
10 The magnitude  of this damage  is hard to measure.  Warshawsky  (1987)
argues that  the  cost  of  adverse selection in  the  United States private  annuities
markets is  between 8% and  16% of  the  annuity amount, but  he assumes that
life  insurance companies adjust  their  prices  to  only  two  ex-ante observables:
age  and sex.23
government in countries with small informal sectors, but it can sell this
information service at cost to private competitive insurers.
Portfolio Diversification:  Private competitive providers offer portfolio
diversification services regularly in the capital market. Moreover,
international diversification seems to be an area where private providers
have an advantage over nationalized providers exposed to political pressures.
Other services: Private competitive providers can efficiently produce services
such as record-keeping of individual accounts, collection of contributions and
payment of monthly pensions, as shown by private banking systems around
the worldl1. Although some functions exhibit economies of scale, such as
collection of contributions, the private sector can use the institutions it has
used in the banking sector fur decades, such as clearinghouses under common
ownership and coordinated legal persecution of employers that delay
payment of contributions. More efficient still is to allow private providers to
piggy-back on the existing banking dearinghouse.
Financial Guarantees: An important issue for workers is the relative value of
public versus private guarantees for their pension income. It is a standard
argument that the government can provide better guarantees at lower cost
than the private sector, because the government can pool more risks. This is
untrue in many developing countries, where the credit standing of the
government is worse than that of leading private firms. In many of the
countries where the government keeps fiscal balance, this is achieved by
constant changes in tax rates and in government transfers. As pension
benefits are a prime target for deficit reduction in many countries, it can be
seen that the value of a government guarantee of pension income is heavily
dependent of the features of the local political process.
International experience shows that governments are less likely to default on
tneir explicit public debt than on their pension promises. This suggests that
private portfolio managers can achieve a better combination of risk and
return by choosing a portfolio that includes government bonds and private
sector securities, than the combination associated to 100%  reliance on pension
promises by the government. This shows that private provision is compatible
with partial reliance on the govermnent's abilities to pool rislP  and to change
taxes.
The main con-lusion is that there is no economic argument for
nationalization of the pension provision industry.  Although some pension
authors, have stated that "just about all observers have accepted social
insurance as a legitimate role for goverunent, .. so the fact that most OECD
countries have public provision of insurance is not surprising" (Munnel,
11 This point is  due to  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel.24
1987) these statements  are simply ungrounded.  Although  there  are no
efficiency argument  against  nationalization,  political  economy  analyses  of
public ownership  offer reasons  to oppose  nationalization.
3.2 Private  selection  of pension  providers
This section discusses  the demand  side of a market  in pensions  services.
Privatization  of demand  is controversial  because  of two reasons: potential
incompatibility  with  mandates  to improvident  workers,  and  potentially  high
administrative  costs. We review  these objections  in  turn.
a) Individual  versus  group  selection of provider.
As demand  is mandated  by the govermnent,  it is natural  to ask whether  the
government  must  necessarily  select the providers.  As argued  in the
companion  paper  (Valdes-Prieto,  1993), if the  government  mandates  pensions
because  of worker  improvidence,  then  the essence  of the government's  role is
to assure  that  improvident  individuals  obtain  and  follow benevolent  advice
on  pension  matters  at low cost. Individual  improvidence  justifies  a
government-mandated  transfer  of that responsibility  to a trustee  system  with
the potential  to improve  on  individual  decisions,  but  it does  not require  that
the  government  itself make those decisions.  Therefore,  private  selection of
provider  is conceptually  compatible  with  mandatory  pensions  if the
individual  worker  is still constrained  to make saving  and  insurance  decisions
with appropriate  effort devoted  to their analysis.
If the government  mandates  pensions  only  to avoid  future  pressures  by
influential  older  groups  that push  for subsidies,  the situation  is
straightforward:  providers  can be chosen directly  by workers,  without  trustees.
This may be the case of state pensions for the military,  or for civil service
employees.
In other words,  mandatory  savings and  insurance  does  not imply
government  selection of providers.  For those  workers  that  are able to perform
the  selection job for themselves,  individual  choice of provider  should  be
allowed.  For the set of improvident  workers  with  little political  clout,
mandatory  savings  and  insurance  only implies  that  selection must be
transferred  to trustees.  Unfortunately,  this  fundamental  distinction  is
acknowledged  very infrequently.
When  choosing  between  the  more complex  insurance  services,  workers  can
hire licensed  financial  advisers12.
12  The limitation here  is  that  regulation of  advisors' fiduciary duties may
prove costly  and  ineffective. In  addition, advisors themselves must  incur  in
marketing expenditures. However, trustees  may  hire  advisors to  serve  the
whole set  of  their  members at  group rates.25
However, forcing improvident workers to choose individually is a
contradiction. Such workers should only be mandated to contribute because
they are improvident, i.e. if they are misinformed, or if they lack self control
or if they behave myopically towards old-age saving. As improvidence
justifies government intervention in their pension decisions in the first
place, it must be expected that improvident workers forced to choose provider
by themselves will act in an improvident way or will evade contributions.
For example, myopic contributors will tend to prefer private providers that
charge commissions that are deducted from future pension b-nefits over
providers that charge commissions deducted from the current after-tax wage.
Myopic contributors will invest too little in search and in education to choose
better among providers, because the benefits from such search are received in
the heavily discounted retirement period13. Misinformed workers may
compare performance among fund managers looking only at the ranking of
past returns, without looking at the ranking of the variance of past returns14.
Miscalculating  workers may be unable to trade off the smaller flat
commission charged by one fund manager for its smaller expected returnl5.
Workers that lack self-control  may find it hard to resist an attrac.ive
salesperson that offers a small gift for switching to a different insurer. If
improvidence justifies mandatory insurance, then individual  workers
should be expected to act improvidently when choosing provider by
themselves.
This is a central problem with the new Chilean pension system, where
workers are expected to choose provider on an individual basis. The ensuing
problems were predicted in Chile in 1980  by local union leaders: "Workers
will not know how to make this decision. They don't have the necessary
elements for judging. It is likely they will not even become interested in it.
Many people do not know how to read and barely know about numbers..."
(Piflera,  1991,  p. 96)16.  Of course, that prediction was self-interested, as union
leaders were trying to obtain a legal exclusivity to act as pension trustees.
13  This  argument is due to  Augusto Iglesias.
14  This point is due to Eduardo Walker.
15 This point is due to  Jorge Claro, who since 1984 has stressed the difficulty to
compare  among  fund  management companies.
16  Piffera (1991) argues this  assertion by  union  leaders embodied arrogant
contempt of  individual liberty and autonomy of  workers (p.  96). This  is  because
he  argues  that  the  only  purpose of  mandatory contributions is  to  reduce the
fiscal cost  of  goverment-financed  basic pensions (p.  68).  But  any tax  can
perform that  simple function, so  his  argument does  not  stand.26
b) Private  versus government  trustees.
Trustees may be private or public. In the nationalization option, some official
body whose members are appointed by the political system -- the president,
parliament, political parties, national federations of employers and labor
unions -- chooses private providers of services such as a portfolio
management, insurance, financial guarantees, record-keeping, collection and
payment. In the private option, providers are chosen by private trustees that
represent natural groupings of workers, such as those with the same
employer or those living in the same municipality.
The Political Economy  of Public Trustees
Nationalized trustees means that some official body whose members are
appointed by the political system chooses private providers of pension
services,  while workers are allocated  by law to an official  body. The official
body could be one -- a monopoly, as in Malaysia and Singapore -- or there
could be several official  bodies (there are three in the case of Sweden).  If they
are many, they could be defined along territorial lines -- municipalities or
provinces17 -- or according to the industry of employment -- banking sector,
port and rail workers, steel and coal workers--
As recommended by the ILO, conventional Social Security Institutions (SSIs)
are public agencies that have a mixed "public-private"  board defined along
industry of employment lines. The ILO-style  board, however, is fully drawn
from the political establishment, because it includes both government
officials and other designated by the national associations of unions and
employers. Such national associations are in many countries part of the
political establishment.
The international experience with ILO-style SSIs, which dominate pension
systems in Latin America,  Southern Europe and the Middle East, has been
dismal. The members of the board of an SSI do not have a mandate from
contributors to maximize performance, because contributors are simply
assigned to the SSI.  On the other hand, the board has an obvious mandate to
serve the interests of the organizations who placed them there, namely
political parties, national labor unions or national employer associations, all
members of the political establishment. The result is that many SSIs have not
defended their contributors' interests successfully, but have facilitated the
channeling of the surpluses of the first decades towards the government, also
dominated by the political establishment.
17 This was suggested by Diamond(1992)  for health. A similar proposal was
offered by Bitran(1992)  for pensions for small countries such as Paraguay.27
The nationalization option also includes variants that limit the influence of
the political system over the official trustees in charge of selection  of private
providers. Board members can be given tenure of their post. Independence
can be buttressed with staggered long-term service periods, as in the case of
some Central Banks. Accountability  can be increased by charging board
members with fiduciary responsibilities. Revision by independent auditors
hired by a different branch of government can be added. Finally, different
pension services may be in charge of different official bodies. For example,
collection and payment services may be offered for bids at the municipal level
by one set of official bodies, while the purchase of financial guarantees or the
portfolio strategy may be decided by another set of bodies at the regional level.
An objection to nationalization is that trustees designated by the political
system will be sensitive to pressures to allocate investments according to the
authorities' preferences. The Swedish experience in 1959-1983  with the AP-
funds is the best example of this. The centre-right parties in Sweden refused
to accept that the AP-funds could hold equity because of its implications for
corporate control. In addition, they opposed that it would choose corporate
bonds freely. The final arrangement was that the AP-funds agreed to follow
the Central Bank's investment guidelines, which in turn  left the bond
selection process in the hand of the two large private sector banks. The final
result is that the AP-funds return has been  3-4%  per year below comparable
rates of return in the Swedish economy (OECD 1988;  Munnell and
Ebensberger,  1990;  Pontusson, 1984).
In the United States, some trustees of pension funds managed by elected
officials  on behalf of state employees have endorsed "socially targeted
investments" 18. These are investments that further public policy goals, like
helping students with loans, lending for the construction of affordable
apartments for low-income families and retraining of unemployed workers.
One such official has recently stated that "the traditional argument that
investment return suffers when external positive values are considered is
wrong"19.
Private Trustees
Given these problems, the option of private trustees merits detailed analysis.
In this case the issue is F --  to allocate workers to trustees. If individual
workers were allowed to choose a trustee, they can be expected to choose
improvidently. Specifically,  if trusteeship were a for-profit free-entry activity,
we should expect a replication of the outcome with individual selection of
provider.
18 The Washington  Post, December  9, 1992,  page F2.
19 She said that "I am hopeful  that, under President  Clinton, those fallacies  will
be  exposed".28
On the other hand, direct allocation of workers to private trustees raises the
possibility of abuse. For example, if employers are required to act as trustees,
they may abuse by choosing providers that offer bribes or favors - low interest
loans, free financial services - at the cost of sacrificing services rendered to
workers. This is a widespread concern in developing countries.
The OECD experience is useful here. In 1985,  Switzerland mandated all
employers to choose a fund manager and insurers for earnings-related
retirement pensions of their employees (OECD, 1988).  There are no reports of
abuse by employers. In 1992  Australia legislated a similar mandate, with the
difference that unions would be the sponsors of groups. In most OECD
countries, employers are allowed to set up pension schemes for their
employees ("private pensions"). These pension schemes could be subject to
abuse or outright theft, as in the recent case of Maxwell in the United
Kingdom, but this has been the exception rather than the norm.
This suggests that there exist organizational alternatives where the risk of
abuse by the employer can be reduced significantly.  In this regard, it is notable
that Swiss law requires employers to "set up their own scheme, which usually
taker the form of a foundation. Mutual funds are also possible but less
common. The important point is that the pension scheme has to be a legally
independent entity and may not be part of the employer's company." (Kunz,
1991)
Other examples of this approach are given by worker accident insurance. In
several countries this coverage is managed by employers, but only through a
specific mutual benefit society whose only purpose is to provide these
services to the workers in member firms. Employers are mandated to cover
their workers and to choose one such mutual benefit society. Of course, the
analogy is not direct because these societies do not limit themselves to the
role of trustee, and also enter directly into the production of insurance and
medical services.
We conclude that private trustees should be organized along the following
lines: (a) Not-for-profit foundations formed by employers, with a board of
trustees chosen by the members (employers and some union representatives);
(b) The role of these foundations would be to hire fund managers, to hire an
insurance company that provided invalidity and survivorship coverage, and
to hire a processing company to collect  contributions, pay benefits and
provide other administrative services to the workers. The foundations
themselves would be banned from producing these services; (c) There should
be regulations on these private foundations.
The risk of employer abuse is greatly reduced because the foundation cannot
obtain equivalent favors for all its member firms. For abusers, this raises the
risk of internal strife and detection of abuse by the authorities. On the other
hand, member firms have a common interest in cost reduction and the29
obtention of better service for workers, because this reduces their labor costs,
so they will give the appropriate signals to board members.
High labor and firm mobility is not a problem in this scheme, because at most
the mutual benefit societies would be charged with the responsibility of
choosing trustees for ex- employees that left member firms in the distant past
but who have not joined another formal employer yet.
Regulations on Private Foundations
Regulation is appropriate when the performance of private trustees can be
improved joining the forces of the private and public sectors. For example,
the employers can provide the trustees and the government can apply
regulations regarding their fiduciary responsibilities, as those imposed by the
ERISA  law in the United States since 1974.
To prevent abuse in the selection of providers, it is essential to impose a
minimum diversification requirement that assures the independence of the
board of trustees from any specific  employer or union. Specifically,  a
regulation would prevent any single employer, any single union, and any set
of employers affiliated into a single business group, from choosing more than
one member of the board of trustees.
Regulations must also prevent trustees from becoming financial
intermediaries that charge commissions,  because in that case improvident
workers would not have access to truly benevolent trustees.
Regulations should also allow workers that are willing to endure the costs of
choosing providers for themselves, and that have shown that they are
provident20, to do so.
Finally, there should be limits on the size of each foundation, measured by
the number of workers, to avoid monopsony power.
Residual Groups
In some developing countries this organizational scheme may be insufficient.
On the one hand, a large proportion of workers at a given point in time is
working in the informal and subsistence sectors, or has exited the domestic
labor force towards household work or has migrated. In addition, the
majority of employers do not belong to trade associations at all, and fewer still
20 A worker that has saved voluntarily  into an account whose funds can only
be drawn at  retirement  car be deemed  provident.  A test of  accumulating  two or
three months worth of  salaiy into such acounts to  qualify for voluntary
contribution is  easily  implementable.30
belong to trade associations with the ability to provide effective  boards of
trustees.
In this setting, some formal sector employers may be unable to provide
trustees to give trustee services to their workers. This does not imply that the
government should provide trustees itself, but only that default groups could
be arranged by the government. Workers that do not belong to an employer-
sponsored foundations would be allocated to the default groups.
The existence of a population of private foundations opens up additional
mechanisms to limit the influence of the political system over the default
groups. It becomes possible to eliminate the discretion of govemment officials
in the most sensitive matters. For example, in a funded pension system, the
fund management decision of the default groups can be defined by statute to
equal the average of the decisions of all private foundations. That is, private
foundations would choose fund management companies, and the default
groups would distribute their funds across fund management companies
according to their share in the private foundation market.
In the case of Chile, for example, we guess that default groups would own
much less than half of total funds. This guess is based on the fact that in June
1992  the 77%  of workers with smaller individual account balances owned
merely 24%  of the total funds 21. In other countries, where the default groups
may own more than half of the funds, this alternative may not work. Other
pension services,  such as selection of the provider of collection and payment
services at the municipal level, can be left to a local official  body without
much risk to workers.
Of course, in some countries regulated private foundations may still be too
few in comparison to the residual groups, so this mix may not work. As this
usually occurs in countries where the political system produces
untrustworthy and improvident trustees, such countries may be better off
without mandatory earnings-related pensions.
If society cannot produce enough provident and trustworthy trustees, then
little improvement over individual improvidence a.s  possible. At most the
government can legislate the simplest short-term irsurance products, such as
disability and death insurance, that can be operated reasonably well even by
an imprudent government. Legislating an old-age annuity system under the
control of an improvident political system or corrupt private trustees is
clearly imprudent.
Summing up, we have shown that there are political economy arguments
that recommend privatization of the selection of provider. The advantages of
21 Boletfn  Superintendencia  de AFP NQ  111, p. 59.31
promoting a private population of foundations are: (a) it reduces political
interference in the selection of trustees to a minimum; (b) it allows new
methods to limit political interference in the management of default groups;
and (c) it allows the overall share of private trustees to rise automatically with
economnic  development over time. There is no reason to believe a private
foundation/  trustee system to be more expensive tc operate than a
nationalized trustee system, because both require a number of regulations to
prevent conflicts of interest and abuses.
c) High Administrative Costs of Private Selection
The second argument for nationalizing demand is that in this area legislation
fixes all the relevant aspects of the insurance contracts except price. In this
setting, opening choice of provider to the private sector would be unnecessary
and inefficient.  Inefficiency  would result because this choice attracts
expenditures in advertising  and salespeople, whose role is to direct more
demand to specific  providers. This expenditure is wasteful because by
assumption legislation has eliminated the differences between providers, so
no judgment must be exercised. Price may be determined more efficiently in
simple auctions.
This argument fails if the services rendered by different providers are not
identical,  because there is potential for a tradeoff of quality for price. In
addition, the pressure of salespeople contribute also to inform workers and
reduce improvidence.
However, if the quality differences are small and perceived differences are
mostly generated by persuasion, either through salespeople or advertising,
the argument still stands. This is the case in instances where verifiable quality
has been regulated or legislated, so that the differences in verifiable quality
become negligible. The costs of free consumer choice  by individual workers
bears this criticism out, as shown by the Chilean experience of high marketing
expenditures and their tilt towards persuasion by salespeople (Arrau, Valdes-
Prieto and Schmidt-Hebbel,1993).
However, in several cases the individual is called to exercise judgment when
choosing provider even when benefits are legislated. The most obvious
example is portfolio selection and insurance company selection. In these cases
private choice  is expected to be superior to political choice. Differences  in
judgment are a form of heterogeneity in tastes, and their satisfaction is a wel-
established advantage of private markets over choice  by politicians. It is
appropriate to sacrifice  economies of scale to obtain more variety to fit
differences in judgment about portfolios and solvency of insurance
companies. In this case, there is a tradeoff between allowing individual choice
and accepting high administrative charges.32
This dilemma disappears when private choice is exercised by the boards of
foundations designated by employers. The experience in the OECD with this
type of private demander is that advertising expenditure is minimal. As
private choice through foundations decentralized judgment at little
administrative cost, it is the best combination.
However, in pension systems where 100%  of the contributions must be
invested in pension promises issued by the government (PAYG  systems) a
significant area for judgment is absent. As the other dimensions of quality
may be specified through regulations, it may become more efficient  for the
government to choose providers in an auction.
Even this conclusion is debatable when we consider technical progress: Given
that portfolio judgement decisions are absent, which is the optimal location
of authority to improve the pension contract over time ? Two polar
alternatives are to keep all decisions at the level of the legislature, and to
transfer power to the private foundations. In intermediate alternatives some
decisions are transferred and others are kept by the legislature.
The fully legislated approach assumes that the government is able to produce
the best available legislation  every year, maybe using the best technical  experts
available. However, this would be convincing only if (a) expert advice will
dominate the legislative outcome; (b) insurance and savings legislation can
specify a large number of contingencies  in advance; and (c) the government is
able to implement sound long-term saving and insurance policies. In many
countries these assumptions have failed. Therefore, there would be an
improvement in dynamic terms if some of these decisions are transferred
outside the political system.
We favor an intermediate approach. For example, the responsibility of setting
the contribution rate and designing new annuity products can be transferred
to trustees of private foundations. Another example is the design of financial
guarantees where the guaranteeing company allows the private foundation to
have some say on the procedures to select fund managers. This is most
convenient in those areas where transfer of responsibility outside the political
system is valuable and where individual tastes and judgments vary
significantly. Still, general legislation should define some features of the
insurance and savings products to assure portability for workers that shift
between foundations.
3.3 Other Regulatory Requirements of Privatization
The development of a private market in pension services such as fund
management and insurance requires a judicious mixture of complementary
laws and on-going regulation by an official  supervisory body. As explained in
section 4, these services and the associated  regulations are necessary ven in an
unfunded pension system, if workers are not forced to invest 100%  of their33
old age savings in government bonds. Providers of other services, such as
recordkeeping or contribution collection,  can be subject to much simpler
regulations.
Regulations to prevent exploitation by fund managers
A design that only prevents exploitation of workers by the political system
can fail, because  abuse by private fund managers and insurers can also
damage affiliates.
Consider the experience of Alaska. The employees of the State of Alaska quit
the US Social  Security System after a referendum in 1980,  because actuarial
studies showed that its relatively young employees would be taxed by staying
in the semi-mature PAYG-financed  federal system, in comparison to the
return they could obtain investing in the capital market. Contributions are
invested in a central fund whose management was contracted out to a private
firm. Although Alaska appears to have succeeded in shielding the fund from
politician-directed investments, it has suffered problems with the private
provider. Alaska's first mistake was to contract out the full fund to just one
private manager, on a long-term basis. In addition, Alaska left the full
responsibility of monitoring this private provider to a single official who was
not a financial expert. The management company chosen turned out to be
close to Michael Milken and invested 70% of the portfolio in junk bonds of
low quality. The fund management company is currently undergoing
bankruptcy procedures and would pay 70 cents on the dollar. In 1992  the state
of Alaska voted a budgetary support of 140 million dollars to the central fund,
providing an ex-post guarantee against fraud and regulatory failure 22.
Specific  Regulations that limit fraud are:
(i) Detailed legal definition of the fiduciary duties of private providers,
including supporting penalties and preventive supervision.
(ii) Regulation of the internal organization of the investment management
firms that wish to sell services to private foundations, that aim at prevention
of some obvious conflicts of interest. Examples include mandatory separation
between the fund management function and management of their own
funds, a mandatory number of independent directors 23, and mandatory
reviews of internal procedures by outside auditors.
22 I  am indebted  to Professor  Dan McGill  from Wharton  for this description  of
the  Alaskan experience.
23 Independent  directors were introduced  in the  United States legislation in
1940. They are directors not linked to the controlling  shareholders  of  the fund
management  firm  and  its  affiliates, although they  are  chosen  by  the  owners of
the  fund managment firm.  This  institution was  proposed by  the  Chilean
government  in  the  January 1993 pension reform package.34
(iii) Regulations that prevent providers from directing pension investments
and reinsurance to affiliated parties.
(iv) In the case of fund managers, regulation of the procedures for buying and
selling securities,  such as those requiring transactions to occur in markets that
are liquid enough to prevent price manipulation and those prohibiting
trading patterns that may allow affiliated parties to exploit pension funds.
(v) In the case of private insurers, it is essential to regulate their solvency to
increase the likelihood they will actually pay the promised benefits. This
protects both the beneficiaries and the government, in case the latter provides
a partial guarantee to annuities. Solvency regulation should stress exposure
to interest rate risk and assure portfolio diversification. Authorization of
variable annuities which transfer part of the investment risk and the lifetable
risk to the annuitant is an attractive option because the solvency
requirements on the insurer can be relaxed substantially.
It is often argued that these regulations are too complex for developing
countries to implement, so privatization will lead to exploitation by
providers. The Chilean experience proves the opposite. It is interesting to
recall the early assessment of observers of the Chilean reform. For example,
Arellano (1981)  wrote that  "....most Chilean banks are part of large business
groups... A similar situation occurs in insurance markets... these same groups
have organized the private providers of pension services to tap the funds of
social security, so their power has increased... the shareholders of the  nine
largest private providers of pension services are these business groups, who
also control 46% of capital and reserves of banking systems...  the risks of an
increase in commissions by an oligopoly of providers has risen substantially".
The Chilean experience shows that these concerns were taken very seriously
by the political establishment, and it reacted imposing strong regulation.
There is abundant evidence that shows that tightening of regulatory
standards in the Chilean financial market started three years before the 1983
insolvencies in the banking sector, with the introduction of prudential
regulation in 1980,  and with a law that imposed a schedule of reduction of
bank loans to affiliated  parties in August 1981.  This law was bitterly opposed
by the local business groups (de la Cuadra and Valdes-Prieto,  1993).  The
sequence of events in Chile suggest that political pressures towards limiting
the financial  power of business groups were triggered precisely by the
approval of the privatization of mandatory pensions. For example, the
February 1981  law that prevented banks from becoming providers to the new
pension system originated in doubts about the financial stability and
efficiency of existing banking supervision mechanisms (Buchi, 1993).  Another
example is that the new pension funds were not authorized to buy equities, as
the securities regulators had denounced share price manipulations in 1980.35
The conclusion is that these regulations can be expected to be implemented in
most middle-income developing countries, because even populist politicians
have clear incentives to promote them. In these countries the real danger is
overregulation of the pension fund management industry and excessive
costs, driven by populist politics. However, this conclusion fails for countries
where a politician cannot build a reputation by attacking abuses by large
business groups, as it may happen in centrally planned economies or where
politics is dominated by the business groups themselves.
Regulations to Avoid Concentration of Power
An important objection to the creation of a govermnent board of trustees that
manages a national pension fund is that it would have excessive  power over
private industry, as it would hold large blocks of private securities such as
corporate bonds, bank bonds and equities. This objection is also raised in
respect to privatized fund management, when the fund management
industry is concentrated.
If the private foundation approach to demand is followed, it is very unlikely
that the fund management industry will become concentrated, as shown by
the US and UK experience. But if that industry becomes concentrated, the
Chilean experience shows how concentration of power can be limited, even if
the fund management industry is concentrated. In 1985,  a law limited total
equity holdings in any one firm by the set of pension funds managed by
affiliated fund-management firms to 7% of the outstanding common stock.
This limited voting power in shareholder meetings. A law proposed in
January 1993  would limit fund management companies to vote for candidates
to the board of directors that are independent from both the fund
management company and the controlling shareholders.
Regulation of joint facilities
It is likely that private providers of some services may wish to organize some
production activities on a jointly-owned  basis to reap economies of scale. An
example is a clearinghouse that reduces the cost of collection by
comnputerization  and centralization of all payments by a given employer with
a single collecting agency. Another is coordination of effort to collect  on
delinquent employers that delay payment of contributions 24.
Such joint facilities should be regulated to prevent their use as barriers to
entry into the provision industry, or as a means to implement side-payments
in collusive agreements among private providers.
24  Joint facilities  should not be prohibited  by statute, as  is currently  the case
in  Chile. In that country, the law prevents fund management  companies  from
engaging  in activities not specifically  prescribed  by law, and there is  no
provision allowing investment in  service companies such  as  clearinghouses.36
3.4 Privatization and Income Redistribution
As in other industries, privatization of provision forces the government to
make explicit choices regarding distribution, which are typically hidden when
provision is nationalized. This problem takes two forms in the pension case:
a) Average pricing and rent dissipation.
The actuarial price of insurance is different for different people. For example,
the rich should get a lower annuity ceteris  paribus,  because their life
expectancy is higher. Nationalized pension systems typically opt for average
pricing, i.e. flat actuarial factors, acknowledging very few or no ex-ante
differences between classes of purchasers of insurance which are objectively
different. For this reason, nationalized pension systems tend to redistribute
wealth in substantial amounts.
Privatization forces legislatures to be explicit about these redistributions. The
government may attempt to tax implicitly those considered as excessively
wealthy by mandating the use of a flat actuarial factor. This policy instrument
is not compatible with efficient privatization because firms will direct their
marketing effort to attract those taxed rather than those subsidized, unless the
difference in risks is small enough. This expenditure will dissipate part of the
rents obtained by serving the taxed groups, by increasing total costs.
Flat actuarial factors should be substituted by an explicit tax and transfer
system, so redistribution can proceed as desired. However, as the political
system is forced to make explicit decisions regarding distribution, it becomes
impossible to engage in capricious redistribution or to favor pressure groups
covertly through mandated flat insurance.
b) Redistribution through administrative charges.
Several pension services have costs that are independent of the income or
wealth of the contributor, so cost-based commissions are more burdensome
for low-income contributors.
In mandatory pension systems where provision is nationalized,
administrative costs are deducted from benefits in a proportional manner.
This is a hidden tax-transfer system that helps low-income contributors.
Privatization of pension provision must introduce some explicit
redistribution mechanism if this distributional objective is to be preserved.
The failure to do this can lead to substantial distortions. The Chilean case is
an example of this problem (see Arrau, Valdes-Prieto and Schmidt-Hebbel,
1993).
A second issue is the possibility of price discrimination. An attempt to deal
with this possibility by forcing providers to charge uniform commissions by37
statute may easily backfire, as the Chilean experience suggests. In that country,
mandatory uniformity of commissions has eliminated the incentives to
employers and unions to sponsor group selection of provider, because they
cannot obtain savings for their members even though group purchase
increases the price elasticity of demand and reduces marketing costs.
The presence of private foundations that negotiate charges with private
providers generates high price elasticities, which in turn reduces radically the
scope of price discrimination by providers. However, the foundation is left
with the task of allocating administrative charges among workers - and firms-
, and it certainly has the power to discriminate between different classes of
workers of member firms.
This raises the danger that political dissatisfaction with the resulting pattern
of distribution may lead to costly auditing procedures and detailed regulations
on foundations, as has happened in the United States regarding private
pensions. The alternative of allocating  total costs according to the marginal
costs associated to each worker may also require the collection  of very large
amounts of information. It may be preferable that the statutes impose a set of
simple rules of thumb that avoids costly procedures and regulations, such as
sharing invalidity and survivorship insurance costs according to the life
tables and covered wage levels, and sharing the remaining costs according to
the outstanding balance in the individual account.
3.5 Externalities  of Capital Market Development
Privatization of provision requires a substantial investment in institutional
development. The regulatory requirements mentioned above impose a large
investment in new institutions, like fiduciary rules, limits to transactions
with affiliated parties, independent directors, identification of conflicts of
interest common in the capital market, insurance contract design and others.
This investment is at the same time a barrier to and an advantage of
privatization. It is a barrier because many countries will find it unrealistic to
commit to such developments. It is an advantage because these institutions
can also be used in the rest of the capital market at little extra cost. This means
that privatization is a commitment to a long-term program of capital market
development. Of course, in theory that same program can be implemented
without privatizing pension provision. However, privatization creates a
pressure group that promotes capital market development in some areas -
fund managers and insurance companies want wider investment portfolios-
while it furthers the careers of  politicians that press for some aspects of
capital market development such as regulation of conflicts of interest.38
4. The Third  Design  Dimensio  Fundhin
Earnings-related  mandatory  pension  systems exhibit an additional  design
dimension,  the  degree of funding,  which  is basically independent  from
insurance  design  and  privatization.
4.1 Privatization  does not require  Funding
The independent  nature  of the funding  dimension  is not  widely  understood,
as suggested  by the abundance  of statements  that postulate  funding  as.a
prerequisite  for privatization.  Just as a transition  to a funded  pension system
does  not assure  an increase  in national  saving, privatization  does  not require
a change in the primary  fiscal balance nor an increase in  national  saving.
Privatization  does  not require  "true" funding;  only  "apparent"  funding  is
needed.
To see this, consider  a country  with a substantial  primary  fiscal deficit, and a
mature  PAYG-financed pension  system, either  balanced  or unbalanced.  A
shift  to competitive  private  provision  on an apparently  funded  basis  can be
achieved  through  the following  steps, without  changing  the primary  fiscal
position:  (a) divide  the initial contribution  rate into a pure  wage tax at a rate
to be determined  (this makes explicit the hidden  tax associated  to a mature
PAYG-financed  pensions2 5) and a (smaller) forced contribution;  (b) each
owner  of pension  entitlements  - both  retired  and  active  - is given  tradable
treasury  bonds  to redeem  the stock of his/her  pension  entitlements.  The
individual  entitlements  would  be calculated  on the basis  of the old pension
benefit  formula. The present  value price of those bonds  does not have to be
determined.  The new debt  would  simply replicate  the promised  structure  of
payments  under  the nationalized  pension  system,  given  that  contribution
stops now. For example, it would  promise  a flow of payments  that starts at the
estimated  pensioning  age and lasts for the estimated  expected  life given
pensioning2 6; (c) workers  are forced to entrust  the management  of their
25The  pure  wage-tax component of  mandatory contributions is  the  present
value  difference between  the  benefits eamed  if  the  contributions were
invested at  the  market rate  of  return  and the  benefits obtained in  the  pension
system, which  yields  a  lower return  (Auerbach and  Kotlikoff, 1987).
Equivalently, the  pure  wage-tax component is  the  cost  to  the  contributor of
being  forced  to  purchase  public  debt  that  yields  a  return  smaller  than  the
market  return.  The  revenue  from  this  pure  wage-tax  is  needed  to  service  the
outstanding  entitlement-pension  debt.
26  This  example follows the  Argentine pension reform proposal of  1992, in
which the  contributions paid  in  the  past  will  continue earning  the  low
demographic interest rate. The Chilean design of  1981 calculated the  size of
payments on  the  basis  of  initial pension benefits, plus 4%  real  interest rate  up
to  the  payment date,  which is  closer to  the  market rate.  This bonus benefited
the  transition  generations  at  the  expense  of  the  future  generations,  because39
treasury bonds and future contributions to one of several licensed fund
management companies or insurance companies, chosen in a way that
depends of the design of the pension system; (d) the fiscal cost of meeting the
promised payments in the newly issued debt is met through the issue of new
debt in amount sufficient to keep constant the debt/wage  bill ratio. The
remaining cost is the interest service (this time at market rates) minus the
growth rate of the wage bill, and it is financed with the proceeds from the new
wage tax discussed in (a). Therefore,  this new debt is rolled over perpetually,
so there is no fiscal effort nor "true" funding.
Once a market for these new issues of public debt establishes a price for them,
this price is used to value the stock of debt managed by private providers, and
the rate of return is used to determine the new wage tax discussed in (a). Its
revenue must assure the absence of fiscal impact. Note that new cohorts
obtain the same pension as if the old system had continued, regardless of the
market determined rate of return that obtains. Even though they contribute
less (the wage tax is not contributed any more) their rate of return is higher,
and the same pension obtains.
Now that apparent funding has been achieved, private fund managers can be
allowed to realign their investment portfolios over time, according to a
schedule. The result is that part of the newly public debt ends up being held by
other investors, while pension funds diversify towards private and foreign
assets.
Note that pension fund managers will exchange treasury bonds for other
assets only if they think they can obtain a higher or safer return, so there
should be no massive sell-off.  This is because the primary market for new
public debt establishes a price that takes risk into account. If market rates on
treasury debt rise as private providers realign investment portfolios, one may
inquire about the cause for imperfect substitution between government debt
and other assets. This increase may be merely making explicit the financial
risks suffered by workers that held pension-entitlement debt. This may be part
of the hidden tax associated to mature PAYG-financed  pensions in a country
where the local government is in a weak financial position. Alternatively, the
increase may be due  to an improvement in investment opportunities in
other securities issued by the domestic private sector or by foreigners.
The market-determined initial yield of the new treasury securities is found
first, and then the size of the wage tax is adjusted to assure fiscal  balance.
Further variations in the market-determined interest rates on long term
treasury debt would be confronted as in standard practice, adjusting taxes and
expenditures.
they obtained a  higher return than expected on  their pre-reform
contributions.40
This arrangement is fiscally equivalent to the initial situation in
intergenerational tax incidence. It is also equivalent in terms of current tax
incidence, because the mixture of true payroll tax, VAT, income tax and other
taxes does not change 27. Abandonment of nationalized provision in favor of
the competitive private altemative need not affect the primary fiscal balance,
the true total public debt nor requires the creation of new taxes. Privatization
only requires re labeling of stocks and flows so that fund managers can realign
portfolios, and this can be done without affecting savings the budget or the
stock of national wealth.
4.2 Problems  and Opportunities  of Funding
a) Inflation Risk and Funding
As discussed at length in section 2.1, one of the main problems with apparent
funding is that few capital markets include a well developed market for long-
term indexed corporate debt. This forces pension fund managers to invest
more in equities, but this is costly in terms of risk. If the only issuer of long
term indexed debt is the government, and its risk-return profile dominates
the one that can be achieved by investing in corporate equity and nominal
debt, then there is no need for fund management services, and a PAYG
financing system offers the best portfolio.
This all-or-nothing conclusion is not convincing unless a market for long-
term indexed corporate debt develops. However, this requires a substantial
effort of capital market development. The main policy in this point is to
redesign banking regulations so that banks can issue short-term (90-180  day)
indexed deposits to finance indexed loans for working capital (365  days) to
firms. Indexed loans for working capital may be attractive to firms because
they can avoid the inflation risk premium charged by depositors-lenders
when the contract is defined in nominal terms. Such reforms must include
adjustments to the tax code to limit taxation only to the real interest earned,
adjustments to the accounting standards, and adjustments to commercial law.
Once indexed bank deposits are available, it is straightforward to extend this
approach to the markets in commercial paper, corporate bonds, mortgage
bond and long-term bank bonds 28.
27  This is a  result I discovered on the  basis of  comments  by Larry Kotlikoff.
28  Indexed pensions are  feasible in  funded pension systems invested in  private
sctor  securities, as  the Chilean experience shows. In  1992, about 20% of
pension investments were in  equities, 40%  in  indexed private sector debt  and
40%  in  indexed government debt.41
As in an unfunded p nsion system, indexation of pension benefits in a
funded system invested in outside assets is subject to the risk of index
adulteration by the political system. This is the risk that a law in the future
redefines the index, de-linking it from the evolution of the CPI. That
happened in Brazil in 1985  during the Plan Cruzado, and was repeated in
some of the next stabilization attempts. The result was that the private
voluntary market in indexed securities disappeared.
b) Liquidity Risks for Individual Pension Funds
It is sometimes argued that funded pensions are subject to the risk that active
contributors may desert a given pension fund while all beneficiaries stay,
leading to a liquidity crisis.
There are two causes for concern. One is that the fund is forced to liquidate its
portfolio because a substantial number of workers leave. It is obvious that
pension fund managers have an interest in arranging the obvious solution:
the selling fund transfers a basket of securities from its portfolio -valued at
current market prices - to the funds where its workers are going. This avoids
liquidation of individual holdings and stock exchange charges.
The other concern is related to the contributor/beneficiary composition. This
is not an appropriate cause for concern. If only beneficiaries  remain in an
insurance company fund, assets have to be liquidated only if no new
beneficiaries  enter the fund, i.e. only if the average age increases over time.
However, this liquidation is quite slow, so no liquidity crises is to be expected.
c) Excessive  savings in the case of true funding.
If a funded pension system is built through new savings - by either starting
such a system anew or by shifting from a PAYG  system with a tax-financed
transition - an important concern is what will be the effect on real rates of
return in the long run. It should be noted that all this saving is being
channeled through the capital markets, which are not very deep in
developing countries. Even in developed countries the effect on real rates of
return could be substantial, as the long term volume of pension funds is
expected to stabilize near 1.5 times GDP.
Assuming a dosed economy, it is conceivable that mandatory savings reduce
the real rates of return below the growth rate of the economy - defined as
population growth plus technical change - in which case we get dynamic
inefficiency.  In recent simulations by Valdes-Prieto and Cifuentes (1993)  with
a general equilibrium model this is shown to be possible, albeit at very high
contribution rates, over 20%.
The optimal policy response to this event is clear: reduce the contribution
rate. This will reduce pension by little, since that reduction will bring higher42
rates of return. An alternative response is for the government to issue more
public debt, so that the degree of true funding is reduced and real rates of
return can rise above the long term growth rate.
A different problem arises when there is no dynamic inefficiency  but the
domestic capital market is unable to absorb these savings at adequate rates of
return. In this case a large private incentive to securitize real assets appears,
because this allows arbitrageurs to pocket a capital gain proportional to the
difference in rates of return between physical and financial assets. In other
words, the supply of financial assets must be very elastic at low rates Qf  return.
d) Funding and privatization of public enterprises
Transition economies are searching for methods to privatize their public
enterprises. A tantalizing alternative is to pay off the pension entitlements
owed to workers and pensioners with shares in these (  erprises. This
involves apparent  funding - no new saving  - so it is easiest to analyze it in
two steps: first, privatization of pension provision as in section 4.1, and
second privatization of public enterprises. In the second step, the government
sells tradable shares in public enterprises and accepts public debt as payment -
retiring public debt. As the govermnent reduces simultaneously its assets and
liabilities, the primary fiscal  balance is not affected.
The advantage of this two-step procedure is that privatization of public
enterprises can proceed at its own pace. The problems of corporate
governance that are central in economies in transition can be attacked over
time. Part of the solution to those problems may include a phased sale of
some equity blocks to pension funds, but they should not be expected to solve
all corporate governance problems. The first priority of pension reform
should be to pay the highest and safest possible pensions, not to privatize
assets.
4.3  The Politics of Funding
a) Introducing a PAYG  financing method commits future governments to
issue debt for 40-70  years.
Introducing a pension system financed with a PAYG method is not
equivalent to a simple fiscal deficit financed with the issue of public debt this
year, which could be discontinued next year because it does not bind the next
government. Rather, it is equivalent to a commitment to issue public debt,
that is to increase the sum of outstanding pension entitlements already
earned by contributors, for the next 40-70  years, which is the duration of the
introductory period.
The issue of pension-entitlement debt can, in theory, be backed by
investments in outside assets such as domestic private securities,  foreign43
assets and physical capital, in which case the net debt remains at zero in every
period. Experience, however, shows this is unlikely. First, in any political
system the presence of a cash surplus sets in motion incentives to spend it,
which may or may not be resisted. Second, as the introduction surplus is
long-term, in the sense that is expected to persist for 40-70  years, it is natural
that the political system chooses to use large parts of it to finance new
programs that require permanent expenditure, such as health care or
financing of a permanent primary budget deficit. Such programs cannot be
reversed by a future government as easily as a transitory deficit. Third, the
alternative of saving the surplus into a  government-managed trust fund is
controversial, due to fears that such a trust fund will lead to government
domination of private industry through its investments in shares and
corporate bonds29. Fourth, even if a fund is maintained, It may be willing to
buy a substantial amount of government debt. This allows the government to
reduce taxes or increase expenditure and run up its explicit debt for 40-70
years. This last point suggests that the introduction of a privately-managed
mandatory pension system can produce fiscal deficits for 40-70  years.
The result is that when a government introduces mandatory earnings-related
pensions it has to accept that there is a significant likelihood that the
introductory surplus will be spent, at least in part. This is equivalent to a
commitment to spend more and save less for the next 40-70  years.
b) Inter-generational redistribution as a rationale for PAYG  financing.
At some points in time some countries have decided that their currently old
generation deserves an income transfer. This has been the case of war
veterans, victims of economic depressions, and maybe some older workers
displaced in transition economies because of the end of the communist
economic system.
To achieve this purpose, the targeted old generation can be granted
extraordinary pensions, financed by taxes to the current young and  yet
unborn generations by financing these expenditures with new public debt.
Introducing a pension system financed through the PAYG method to help
such old generations is not equivalent to this policy. The number of cohorts
that receive a transfer (net subsidy) when PAYG-financed  pensions are
introduced is between 40 and 70. This means that a limited transfer to a few
unfortunate cohorts is used as an excuse to engineer a much larger transfer to
all generations alive during the introduction and usually to quite a few more.
29 This was the main argument  behind  the 1939 reform  to the US Social
Security System that changed  its basis from funded to unfunded  (  see
Achenbaum, 1986).44
To see this, consider the case of a worker aged 45 at the date of introduction.
In the case where contributions and benefits are set at the start to allow cash-
flow balance in the long run, this worker will receive a full pension even if
he will contribute for only 20 years. This implies a net subsidy even after
subtracting the hidden tax associated to steady-state PAYG  financing. In
practice, contribution rates are slowly  increased over time, so even a worker
that entered the work force 10 years after introduction may obtain a net
subsidy. Another important mechanism that may raise the number of
subsidized generations substantially is the gradual extension of coverage as
the formal sector increases its relative importance with the process of.
economic development 30.
Such a massive transfer to all the currently living generations would rarely
survive explicit policy discussions. When the currently working generations
just want help out some of the current old generations, the use of a policy
that transfers resources to themselves is a clear mistake at the expense of yet-
unbom  generations.
Another argument that justifies introducing a pension system financed
through the PAYG  method to achieve intergenerational redistribution argues
as follows: currently alive generations are poorer than yet-unborn
generations, so a transfer towards the all those currently alive is desirable
from an egalitarian point of view3l. However, it has been observed in many
countries that transitory income increases are used to pay off national debt.
This was the case in England during the last three hundred years (Barro,
1986),  Indonesia after the second oil shock, and Colombia during the 1978-80
coffee boom. The fact that many countries have reduced their national debt
when income rises transitorily suggests that the egalitarian transfer argument
was deemed spurious at least in those cases.
In fact, inter-generational transfers frequently go in the reverse direction, i.e.
from the living generations towards the future generations. The massive size
of observed educational expenses suggests that inter-generational transfers
towards the currently living are deemed undesirable. This undermines the
egalitarian transfer argument to justify the issue of implicit debt by
introducing a PAYG-financed  pension system.
30  If  extension of  coverage proceeds from higher income to  lower income
workers,  this  intergenerational  redistribution  is  regressive.
31  A  identical inter-generational redistribution  is  obtained  when the
government inaugurates a  70  -year program of  issue of  public debt, to  be
serviced by  future increases in  wage taxes,  and  spends the  proceeds to  benefit
current  generations.  A  desire  for  massive  inter-generational  redistribution
does not have to  be satisfied by  the  pension system.45
c) The empirical tendency  of mandatory  pension systems towards  PAYG
financing.
In the British case, William Beveridge recommended that a fund be formed
with the contributions of the first 25 years. In fact, the funds were rapidly
spent to help the veterans of World War II and the Great Depression
(Falkingham and Johnson, 1992).  It is not surprising that the veterans
received help. What matters to us is that the government refused to raise
general taxes to finance this new expenditure and instead turned to the cash
flow generated by the pension system. This tendency can also be observed
operating in the U.S.  federal social security now. The social security program
has been accumulating a trust fund since 1983 to confront the demographic
effects  of the baby-boom generation. However, the inclusion of social security,
which is in surplus, into the Gramm-Rudman budget  definition has allowed
the primary federal deficit to be much larger than what it appears to be
(Leonard, 1990).
In the Southern Cone of Latin America - Argentina, Chile and Uruguay -
mandatory social insurance programs were introduced in the 1920's.  In these
countries a part of the introductory surplus was invested in government debt
at low nominal interest rates and the rest was destined to finance the cost of
additional branches of social security, like health service that was delivered
free to affiliates. In one Chilean Social Security Institute, over 40%  of
contributions were paid back as family allowances (Wagner, 1983).  The new
benefits were available only to the institutions' contributors, i.e. not to all
citizens. This lead to a maze of privileges and inequities. For example, in
Chile only white collar private sector workers obtained the huge family
allowance, while blue collar workers that were substantially less well-off did
not get one. These inequities fueled popular support for politicians that
promised to equalize benefits across institutions, by raising them to equal the
most generous. The whittling down of reserves led the Southern Cone
countries to legally acknowledge a de-facto shift to a PAYG  financing system
in the 1950's.
An almost universal :?ndency from full to partial funding, propelled by the
same political economy factors, has been observed in most other countries of
Latin America with state pension systems (Mesa-Lago,  1978,1990).  This
process was accelerated in the 1980's  by the debt crisis, because many
governments raided the social security funds by paying negative real rates of
return in their borrowings from them (Mesa-Lago,  1991).
The tendency of mandatory funded systems to spend the funds has also been
observed in Africa also. Vittas (1992)  reports real rates of return below -10%
per year in the countries with provident funds. A dramatic case of
mismanagement is the Philippines, where President Ferdinand Marcos46
raided the provident funds for personal purposes (Far Eastern Economic
Review, 11/29/90).
Coming back to the OECD,  the Canadian case is reviewed by A. Munnell and
N. Ebensberger in Weaver (1990).  Canada instituted an earnings-related
pension scheme in 1963,  that began paying pensions in 1976.  This allowed the
accumulation of contributions for 13 years, creating two pension funds whose
volume added to 8% of GDP. The largest of these two funds was invested
mostly in provincial government debt. This fund obtained a return smaller
than the market interest rate for the same risk, and some provincial
governments increased spending and reduced taxes in response to the
availability of these funds.
Another factor behind low returns for pension funds in 1930-1979  was the
repression of financial markets, including exchange controls, ceilings on
nominal interest rates and punitive taxes on dividend payouts. This induced
many trustees to invest in real estate, but in many cases populist rent-control
laws led to a squalid income and substantial depreciation of capital values.
d) Balanced PAYG  financing is not the limit.
Another important empirical fact is that the dynamics of the political system
may lead further than the issue of a large hidden debt, into a cash deficit at the
pension system that induces a fiscal crisis.
The three mechanisms that may generate this result are: (a) the new
permanent spending programs to be financed with the introductory surplus  is
bound to generate a fiscal crunch 40-70  years after introduction. This crunch
forces the political system to either raise general taxes or reduce spending, but
there is a chance of gridlock, which would lead to a fiscal  crisis; (b) exogenous
events such as the demographic transition and the slowdown of productivity
growth may push the pension system into a deficit which the overall fiscal
position cannot absorb without going through a crisis first; and (c) problems
in the overall fiscal  position may lead to attempts to draw revenue from the
pension system, at a scale that this system cannot absorb without going
through a crisis.
The common thread in these processes is that budget crunches are not easy to
manage for the political system. This is true in the simple case where the end
of the surplus occurs slowly over time, but it is even more likely when an
unexpected shock occurs. In the case of predictable trends like the
demographic transition and the increase in longevity substantial foresight is
required from the political system to avert a fiscal crisis. These predictable
developments tend to bankrupt a balanced and unfunded PAYG  system that
is balanced at the initial demographics. The political system should act
decades ahead by raising contributions or reducing benefits  - both deeply47
unpopular- to maintain the insurance value of pensions. Experience shows
this is unlikely (OECD,  1988).
Similar requirements on long-term political responsibility are inwrrduced by
other trends in the labor markets that take ten or more years to rt vert, like
increases in net emigration by the young (the case of Uruguay), reductions in
the rate of increase in labor force participation, increases  in the
unemployment rate, increases in the share of employed workers that work
independently or in the informal sector (Argentina in the 1980's),  increases in
the willingness to under report taxable wage income, reductions in the rate of
growth of average real wages and reductions in the average hours worked.
Another process emphasizes uncontrolled growth in benefits rather than a
reduction in collections.  If the transition to PAYG  and the associated
expenditure of the surplus originated in the contributions of the first 40-70
years is not managed with uniform contributions and benefits across sectors,
inequities may allow politicians that offer upward-equalization in pension
benefits to achieve electoral success, even if the long-term finances of the
pension system become jeopardized.
A funded pension system, that invests in outside assets - different from the
local government's debt and state enterprise debt - offers more defenses for
the owners of pension entitlements. Of course, if outside assets exist, the
government may attempt to tax or take the funds in various ways. However,
if  political incentive mechanisms as those discussed below are in place,
politicians will be forced to stop this process. Meanwhile the pension fund
can be slowly drawn down and pension benefits will continue to be paid.
Specially-designed  political incentive mechanisms can also be used in PAYG-
financed systems. Nevertheless, their effectiveness is much higher when the
pension system is funded, because the existence of a fund provides timne  for
the political incentive mechanisms to operate.
e) A few countries have succeeded in maintaining mandatory pensions
funded.
A few countries have met qualified success in backing their pension-
entitlement debt at least partially with investments in non-government
securities. These experiences allow us to extract lessons about mechanisms
that limit the political-economy  dynamics described previously.
In Canada, the smaller Quebec fund was invested in corporate debt and
equity. It obtained market returns while its presence did not  induce the
province of Quebec to increase its primary deficit. This suggests that some
institutional designs are more effective to deal with political pressures and
can allow a fund to survive (Munnell and Ernsberger, 1990).48
The Swedish case, also reviewed by Munnell and Ernsberger (1990),  is also a
qualified success. Sweden established an earnings-related pension scheme
called ATP in 1959,  and waited 20 years to make its first pension payment. It
accumulated funds for 30%  of GDP. It pays defined-benefit  pensions, equal to
60%  of the average earnings of the best 15 years. A large part of the AP funds,
which almost reached 75% at some point, were invested in Swedish
gov'ernment securities,  but a substantial fraction was lent to domestic banks
and corporations. One interesting feature is that the board of trustees is
separate from the rest of the government, although its members are
designated by Parliament. Regarding investment returns, they were
substandard by 3-4%  (anual) compared with what could have been obtained
with a domestic portfolio (Pontusson, 1984),  which cumulates to at least 45%
in value after 20 years. It was probably even worse than what could had been
achieved with an international portfolio, as the AP funds had to comply with
the financial repression and exchange controls imposed by the Swedish
Central Bank up to 1986.
Singapore and Malaysia have been able to build national provident funds for
40 years. The Singapore Central Provident Fund invests 100%  in government
securities, but its financially conservative government appears to have
invested this sum and even more in foreign assets. The Malaysian Employees
Provident Fund (EPF)  is forced by law to invest at least 70%  in government
securities, and during most of its existence it has invested close to 90% in
them. The Minister of Finance appoints directly four of the seven members of
the investment board, and a statute guarantees a floor of 2.5% annual interest
rate to affiliates (nominal).  Up to 1986,  the EPF yielded 3-4%  (annual) below
the average interest earned by bank loans, but this difference dissappeared in
1987-89.  On the other hand, the nature of political competition in both
countries is rather peculiar, so it is not clear how representative is their
example.
Another case is Chile, where a reform to the mandatory pension system
occurred in 1981  and introduced a mandatory defined-contribution system
based on individual accounts. The Chilean funds have produced rates of
return very close to those available in the local market for the same level of
risk (Walker, 1993).  Special features of the Chilean funds is that they are
prohibited from investing more than 45% in government securities and that
they are managed by fund management companies chosen directly by
affiliates. A notable event occurred in 1991  in Chile, when several fund
management companies sued  the State Development Bank for not meeting
in full a guarantee it had issued in favor of bonds issued by an ailing coal
company. This degree of conflict with the political establishment has not been
observed in other pension systems.49
U4 Constitutional design to sustain funding.
The political economy problem in compulsory pension systems is that they
are prone to operate as off-budget pork-barrels, at the cost of national saving.
One policy response is to take measures at the constitutional level that
sustain responsible policy-making and a long-term outlook. This section
outlines policy measures available at the level of constitutional design. We
draw heavily on the modest set of success stories mentioned above.
Reform of the law-making process
An important institutional reform is to raise pension matters to a
constitutional status similar to that granted to the budgetary process. This can
be achieved by restricting the right to initiate law in pension matters to the
executive branch of government 32. This helps by preventing individual
elected representatives from proposing increases in pension benefits without
having assured first the existence of financing that is compatible with overall
fiscal  policy.
Introduce a new Institution: The Independent Actuary.
In most developing countries, the government does not project periodically
its pension liabilities for the next two generations, say 80 years or more. This
reduces  awareness of the financial implications of current pension benefits
and taxes among politicians, leading to mismanagement of this critical
element of fiscal policy. The result is increased variability of benefits and
contributions, and an excessive vulnerability to the pressure of interest
groups.
An improvement can be achieved by creating a quasi-independent body with
the responsibility of making actuarial projections of mandated pensions and
of supervising the overall performance of the pension system. Independence
can be achieved through a board with members with overlapping tenures, as
is common in independent Central Banks. Such a body may be entrusted with
the power to adjust some basic parameters, such as the contribution rate.
Reform of political incentives by assuring the electorate identifies the issues:
This approach facilitates identification of the losers from a policy of
underfunding among the electorate. This can be achieved by creating a direct
link between the financial performance of pension funds and the economic
interest of significant public opinion. Specific  policies are:
32 This reform was adopted  in Chile in the 1980 constitution.50
i) Change the pension definition to the defined contribution type, so that
benefits depend of the performance of the funds. This creates a large pressure
group, which is the set of all contributors, in favor of maximum performance
(return and security) and against premature spending of their contributions
for other purposes. A shift towards defined contribution programs should
exclude persons close to retirement and old pensioners, because they are in no
position to absorb too much investment risk. This tradeoff can be avoided by
insuring pensioners and older workers against investment risk, but not
younger workers.
ii) 100%  of the contribution should be collected in the name of the
contributors. This is almost the opposite of the common practice of dividing
contributions between the employer and the employee 33. The gain from
collecting all the contributions in the name of the worker is to strengthen
his/her  perception that all the funds are his/her  private property. This may
improve public opinion's perception of the legal right contributors have to
maximum investment performance and of the risk that future governments
may default on the benefits promised today.
iii) Introduce individual accounts with periodic reports. This policy measure
supports the message that the funds are the private property of contributors
and that they have the right to require maximum performance. This measure
does need not be expensive, since mandatory pension system have to keep
individual records anyway for the calculation of the average income on
which invalidity and survivors benefits are based.
Avoid regulations that impose a minimum holding of government's
securities
The international experience reviewed above shows pension entitlements are
subject to sovereign risk just as any other type of government debt. Voluntary
creditors to sovereigns recognized long ago that one of their best defenses lies
in fungibility of old and new debt.  This requires unencumbered tradability of
titles, which are just the opposite of the specially issued, non-transferable
titles that state pension funds receive in many parts of the world.
Experience in Quebec and Chile supports the notion that pension funds
become able to preserve value when they are allowed to invest a substantial
amount in private sector securities.  This gives them the ability to reduce
their exposure to sovereign risk, and at the same time disciplines the
sovereign into safe financial behavior, because these funds are not longer
assured. That is why an important constitutional reform is to prevent the
33  Of course, this practice  does not affect the economic  incidence  of the
contribution, whatever it  might be.5 1
legislature from passing laws that force the pension funds to purchase
minimum quotas of government securities.
Allow international investment of part of the pension funds.
A similar case for allowing international investments can be made. Forcing
pension funds to invest domestically when the country is small may
seriously impair the risk-return possibilities that can be offered to
contributors. More important in this section, such investment restrictions
clearly reduce the pressure on the local government to increase the quality of
its securities by following sound financial policies.
Privatize demand to improve political incentives
One problem of making a mass of citizens oppose reductions in returns and
increases  in risk that reduce the quality of their pensions is (hat few have a
concentrated interest in defending fund performance. We must keep in mind
that proponents of public spending programs do have a concentrated interest
in using the introductory pensioii surplus or taxes on outstanding pension
assets to finance their programs.
The creation of political intermediaries that receive a mandate from masses
of contributors to prevent underfunding of benefits and under-performance
would solve this problem. One way to achieve this is to privatize the
ownership of  -ension assets.
For example, consider the case where pension assets are held by insurance
companies that absorb investment risks. When insurance companies accept
premiums in exchange for pension promises, the funds become their private
property. In this case constitutional protection of property rights and the clout
of the insurance industry as a pressure group assure the existence of effective
political opposition to attempts to reduce returns.
In a defined contribution setting we must consider the role of privately
controlled trustee foundations that  choose the identity of the providers of
fund management services. From a legal point of view, trustees are
fiduciaries with a mandate to defend the interests of the contributors whose
employers chose them. If a proposed statute would impose a tax on all
pension returns or force a part of all pension funds to be invested in low-
yielding government securities, trustee foundations would have a fiduciary
responsibility to oppose it. The set of trustee foundations are an effective
pressure group that represents contributor interests in the political process.
Even in the absence of trustee foundations, but with individual choice of
provider, this arrangement may be quite effective if it is in the commercial
interest of an individual fund manager to oppose in the political arena any
attempt to reduce returns. This may happen is such opposition creates52
goodwill for it, increasing demand for its services. The Chilean experience of
1991,  is that several pension fund managers sued the state development bank
CORFO  when it tried to renegotiate a bond guarantee that came due. This
degree of political assertiveness could only happen because fund manager
selection is privatized in Chile.
A private fund manager cannot be "removed" from its fiduciary role without
previously convincing trustee foundations or contributors that they should
switch provider. On the other hand, a bad performance has the potential of
being met with a flight of clients and dissolution. This disciplines the private
provider. In addition, it is possible to maximize the rivalry between providers
by allowing them to be profit-oriented commercial firms. This is why a
complementar> policy is to shun state-controlled fund managers and
insurers, since their dependence from politicians through other channels
limits their ability to press for contributors' interests.
Given the experience around the world with government-managed pension
systems, the privatization of demand for pension services appears as
attractive protection and the most effective tool to increase the expected value
of pension promises.
5. Linkages between the design dimensions.
This section discusses the interaction between the three design dimensions.
We argue that the independence of the three design dimensions is limited
when adding political economy considerations.
5.1 Two coherent combinations
Although each of the three design dimensions is multidimensional, we will
reduce them to a few choices in this subsection. In the insurance dimension,
we feel that there are two essential choices:  flat actuarial factor versus
individual actuarial factor, and defined benefit versus defined contribution
(in the financial guarantee sense). In the privatization dimension, the two
essential choices are private or nationalized provision, and private or
nationalized demand. In the funding dimension, two choices are true
funding or not, and apparent funding or PAYG financing.
There are many possible combinations,  but some of them can be discarded.
For example, let us consider privatization of supply. Regarding fund
management, privatization is compatible with apparent funding, but not
with PAYG  financing, because in the latter there are no funds to invest in the
capital market. Privatization should not be combined with flat actuarial
factors,  because private suppliers will compete to access the rents that accrue
to workers that are awarded implicit subsidies. This competition will dissipate53
part of that rent into costs and apparent beneficiaries  will not receive what the
statute awarded them. Privatization also leads to expensive risk sharing when
using purely the defined benefit risk allocation in its strictest sense. This is
because a full inflation-proof  guarantee of return for many decades sinto the
future requires large risk premia, which reduce benefits very significantly.
Only governments o state-owned agencies are cavalier enough to offer such
guarantee at less than actuarial risk premia. In order to have acceptable
private provision, some risk absorption by beneficiaries  is needed. This can be
achieved by both DC and DB  plans, of which the best is the one that is more
transparent regarding risk absorption. This argues for defined-contribution
type plans which include some investment guarantees. Political economy
factors suggest that true funding is not a realistic option for most countries,
although the Chilean experience is that it can be done (Diamond and Valdes-
Prieto, 1993).  In most political settings, at most partial funding can be hoped
for.
The final option regards privatization versus nationalization of demand of
pension services. This is the option between allocating workers to the private
providers that the authority selects through bids, and letting the dose
representatives of workers choose provider of services. Although
nationalized demand is feasible, as can be seen in pension plans for state
employees in the United States, the analysis in section 4 suggests that
privatization of demand (through foundations elected by employers)
produces better political incentives to maximize the size and security of
pension benefits for individual workers, for any given contribution rate. It is
clear that nationalized demand of pension services w  uld not work well in
countries where the political process is underdevelopeed, in the sense that
there are few effective checks and balances or where politics are seen by many
participants as a means towards personal enrichment.
This implies that privatized pension systems should be based on an
individual actuarial factor, some type of defined contribution risk allocation
and apparent funding. Privatized demand is the natural implication of
private provision. The difference between this coherent design and the
current Chilean system is that private choice of provider should not be
restricted to individuals, as employer selection is an attractive option.
On the other hand, if a flat actuarial factor is chosen, the associated
redistribution imposes adaptation in other design dimensions. First,
nationalized demand is the natural match to assure that the implicit
redistribution is achieved at minimum cost, with no erosion because of
choice by workers. The next step is to choose between private or nationalized
production. Because  of the significant sunk costs in specialized accounting
services and in expert human capital, it is natural to prefer vertical
integration, which implies nationalization. This is not true of the fund
management function, if it exists. Although any funding mode is feasible,54
political incentives  suggest  that PAYG financing  will be chosen, either  in the
short  or the long run,  as shown  by the evolution  of pension  systems in many
countries.  This does not negate  that this outcome  can be avoided  for a long
time, as shown  by Sweden and Malaysia, where  apparent  funding  is
dominant.  When  production  of pension  services  is nationalized,  the  defined
benefit risk allocation may deceive policymakers  by looking  reasonably  cheap,
as insurance  fees are not demanded  by the state organization  that produces
pensions.  However,  a mode  in which part of the risk is explicitly absorbed  by
workers  must still be recommended  to maintain  fiscal stability.  If the
government  is guaranteeing  the real value of pensions.  This may be very
hard  to achieve in a setting  where production  is nationalized  and  the political
process prefers  to show "success" by paying  high pensions.  The result  is that
the statute  guarantees  a fully defined  benefit risk allocation, but  in times of
fiscal stress the statute  is adjusted to reduce  real pensions.  In conclusion, a
pension  system built  around  a flat actuarial  factor is the conventional
pension system  as observed  in many OECD countries.
Summing up,  the policy choice is between  two coherent  overall  designs: an
individual  actuarial  factor with  privatized  production  and  demand,  explicit
risk allocation to pensioners  and partial funding,  or a flat actuarial  factor
coupled with  nationalized  production,  PAYG financing  and  statutory
promises  of fixed real pensions  (defined benefit).
5.2 The degree of funding  and risk management.
Balanced PAYG pension  systems offer a risk-return  pair  that is poorer  than
what  can be obtained  in modern  capital markets. To see this, consider  if a
sensible fund  manager  would  invest  100% of a pension  portfolio  in an
imagina  y security whose return  were tied to the rate of growth  of the
covered  wage bill. This imaginary  security would  yield  more  than equities in
recessions or in a year of stock-market panic, but the same is true of high
grade  corporate bonds,  short-term  bank deposits  and  government  debt. For
example, during  the Great  Depression in the United  States, treasury  bills
offered a much higher return  than the covered  wage bill, which was beset by
unemployment  and  the growth  of the  informal  sector.  An efficient portfolio
would  always include  long term bonds, short-term  deposits  and equities  to
gain in the upside,  as demonstrated  by the portfolio policies of the company
pension  plans in the OECD.
In a small open economy,  PAYG financing  is clearly inferior  to reliance on
the world  capial market.  The inferiority  of the risk-return  pair offered by the
hypothetical  security whose return  is tied to the rate of growth  of the covered
wage bi:l in the domestic  economy is much  more evident,  because  the
opportunities  for international  diversification  of risk are  wasted.
Pension systems  should  optimize  the risk-return  profile  they offer, without
relying on state guarantees.  In the case of PAYG-financed systems they are55
unable to do so using standard portfolio choice. However, it can be suggested
that they buy insurance for the event of a fall in coverage, a fall in real wages,
etceteras in the private financial markets and from the government.
However, state-managed PAYG-financed  systems will have only limited
access to private guarantees of this sort, because of moral hazard. A
government may find it difficult to insure against a rise of unemployment or
against an increase in under reporting, because it is the govemment itself
who sets the rules for unemployment benefits and enforces the collection of
contributions. As the govemment has significant control over the incidence
of the risk insured, and events like lax enforcement of collection are not
verifiable  in a court, the problem of moral hazard is substantial in PAYG-
financed systems.
5.3 Government Guarantees, Renegotiation and Equity.
In the end, PAYG-financed  pension systems built around a flat actuarial factor
make up for their inferior portfolio performance through a govemment
guarantee. Myers (1992)  argues that:
"...critics  of the current OASDI  system in the United States do not
recognize that a social insurance system is flexible and, if financial
difficulties arise in the future, appropriate (and probably small)
adjustments in contribution rates and/or  benefit provisions can
easily be made to rectify the situation".
In other words, future taxpaying generations must pay the cost of the
guarantee in pension systems built around a flat actuarial factor. Instead of
relying on the capital markets to value and produce these guarantees, a
conventional PAYG system relies on future legislation to impose
intergenerational transfers.  The standard themes of intergenerational equity
arise at this point, as do the well-known underrepresentaion  of future
generations in the current political process.
In a small open economy, which is subject to more variability, the cost of the
fiscal guarantee needed to make PAYG  financing viable is relatively much
larger than in a large country. By the same token, such a fiscal guarantee is
less valuable in a small country because it is less credible. This is because the
risks that the local government will be unable to tax future generations as
required is much higher. This is due to the higher volatily of the growth rate
of the local wage bill, the higher risk of losing a foreign war and to higher
emigration risks. Recall that we are considering risks over a 80-year horizon.
The risk of emigration is still higher in small countries that specialize in the
export of a few commodities. To the contrary, a funded pension system that
invests around the world through private providers has a higher chance of
providing benefits to workers if these risks materialize.56
Still, it may be possible that in very large countries the government can
produce these guarantees at a lower cost than the world capital market.
Credibility is also important. In mandatory pension systems where benefits
are guaranteed by the state, benefits are subject to future renegotiation because
the law that defines benefits is subject to future revisions. Pension benefits in
such a setting can at most be endowed with property rights equivalent to
those that apply to holders of sovereign debt issued by the domestic
government. In fact, pension entitlements are usually endowed with even
weaker property rights, because unlike sovereign debt, future renegotiation of
pension benefits does not even breach into constitutional protections 34.
This is undesirable for two reasons. First, the possibility of renegotiation
implies that current contributions are perceived as a tax to a larger extent
while benefits become more like a subsidy, weakening the linkage between
the two. This promotes evasion and raises the disincentive for work beyond
the level implied by the mandatory nature of the pension system. Second,
future renegotiation generates uncertainty among beneficiaries about the true
value of their pension entitlements. For example, the experience of pension
benefits eroded by inflation because government finances requires the
revenue of the inflation tax is widespread among developing countries. In
this sense, good insurance design requires credible promises.
Many of these renegotiations are the result of bureaucratic irresponsibility,
political short-termism and benevolent inefficiency in the political process. It
is unknown how many large countries really pass the test of credibility. In the
United States, an Associated  Press-NBC  News poll taken in late 1982  showed
that 75% of respondents had little or no confidence that OASDI  would
continue to exist (Myers,  1992).
In a mandatory earnings-related pension system built around private
provision, the individual worker is required  to forego some intergenerational
insurance, and to pay explicit fees for the guarantees received. Many workers
may prefer to do so in order to reduce risk at this more general level.
34  Wagner  (1983) argued that the drawback  of  unfunded  pension systems  is
that  individual property rights are  not  well  defined.  This  is  incorrect because
the law that defines the benefit formula gives rights to  individuals  that will
be supported  by the courts,  be they  nominal or  real pensions.  This is the case
in  Argentina,  where the failure of  the government  to  pay the pensions
defined in the law had originated  80,000 lawsuits against the state by early
1991, of which 20,000  have already  been resolved against the state and the rest
is  expecting resolution  (Message  of  Pension Reform Project, presented  to the
Argentinean Congress  in  June  1992).REFERENCES
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